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ARTICLES
AN ATTACK ON CATEGORICAL
APPROACHES TO FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
Pierre J. Schlag*
Attempts to secure a theoretical understanding of the first
amendment's protection of speech currently confront two funda-
mental issues: the identification of the values that support free-
dom of speech and the development of an appropriate
methodology to determine when those values are sufficiently im-
plicated in concrete factual settings to warrant protection of the
speech activity.' The first issue poses a philosophical question as
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A. Yale, 1975; J.D.
UCLA School of Law, 1978. An earlier draft of this Article was written in collabora-
tion with my former colleague, James R. Asperger.
1. Recently, the commentators have shown significant interest in developing
theories explaining the justifications for and the structure of the first amendment's
protection of speech. See, e.g., Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory
of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Baker,
Process of Change]; Baker, Realizing Self-Realization. Corporate Political Expendi-
tures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Baker, Realizing Self-Realization]; Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Baker, First
Amendment Freedom ]; BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry
Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521;
Bloustein, The Origin, Validity and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by
Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 372 (1981); Bloustein, Why Is Freedom
of Speech a Problem in Contemporary America?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 59 (1981); Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971);
Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157
(1980); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1980); Farber,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment:. A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727
(1980); Fuchs, Further Steps Toward a General Theory of Freedom of Expression, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 347 (1976); Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
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to the justification for freedom of speech. The second issue en-
compasses the continuing controversy over whether first amend-
ment adjudication should be grounded on a categorical (and
possibly absolute) theory or whether a balancing of competing in-
terests is more appropriate. 2
Categorical theories may be defined as those theories at-
tempting to delimit first amendment protection by reliance on
broad and abstract classifications of protected or unprotected
speech. 3 Absolute theories ascribe "full" protection to a speech
activity, regardless of the opposing state interest in proscription or
regulation, once it is determined that the activity constitutes
speech within the meaning of the first amendment.4 All absolute
ment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975); Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Free-
dom of Expression.4 Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Redish, Democracy and Freedom]; Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Redish, Value of Free
Speech]; Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L.
REV. 519 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Scanlon, Freedom of Expression]; Scanlon, A
Theory ofFreedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Shif-
frin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 915 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech]; Shif-
frin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Shiffrin,
Government Speech]; Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U.L. REV.
237 (1978); Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 107 (1982); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979).
2. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582-84 (1978). For a sam-
ple of the recent literature on the role of categories in first amendment jurisprudence,
see Scanlon, Freedom of Expression, supra note 1; Schauer, supra note 1; Shiffrin,
Government Speech, supra note 1.
3. The term "categorical" can be misleading. Literally, the term means either
(1) of or pertaining to categories or (2) unconditional or absolute. In speaking of
categorical approaches, I am referring to an approach which (i) defines a class or
classes of speech protected by the first amendment and (2) accords or denies protec-
tion (to whatever degree) to the class or the classes of speech in a categorical manner,
i.e., by operation of an unconditional rule.
For purposes of this Article, an unconditional rule is one which directs that some
degree of protection be granted to particular speech once it is decided that the speech
falls within the class. (Obviously, a rule can be more or less unconditional depending
upon its substantive content. For my purposes, once a rule incorporates too many
variables, or exceptions, it is no longer "unconditional.") The categorical approach,
thus defined, is distinguished from other approaches (e.g., ad hoc and definitional
balancing) largely on the basis of methodology. Under a categorical approach,
speech is not shielded from suppression because the state interests advanced are weak
or because the speech itself is intrinsically worthy of protection, but because the
speech belongs to a class of speech to which an unconditional rule applies; conversely,
speech may be denied protection without regard to its value or the importance of the
state interests posited if it belongs to a class which is not protected or if it falls outside
all classes granted protection. See also infra note 9.
4. The theories of Professors Meiklejohn, Baker, and Emerson, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 123-211, are all absolute theories in that none of them
would permit state regulation or prohibition of speech once it is determined that such
speech is speech within the meaning of the first amendment. The marketplace of
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theories of the first amendment are categorical in that they pre-
suppose a definition of what constitutes speech and uncondition-
ally attach "full" protection to that speech. Not all categorical
theories, however, are absolute; some define subcategories of pro-
tected speech but attach different levels of protection to each.5
For example, some categorical theorists would agree that both
political speech and commercial speech are protected by the first
amendment and yet contend that commercial speech is less pro-
tected than political speech. 6
Balancing approaches to the first amendment may be subdi-
vided into ad hoc balancing and definitional balancing. An ad
hoc approach weighs, in each particular case, the interests served
by the speech against the asserted state interest in prohibition or
regulation.7 Definitional balancing weighs the values served by a
particular class of speech against the state interest asserted in the
particular case.8 Definitional balancing is theoretically distin-
guishable from non-absolutist categorical approaches in that the
former admits of balancing, whereas the latter does not. Under
non-absolutist categorical approaches, the importance of the state
ideas theories are not necessarily absolute in this sense. In light of the utilitarian
premises of marketplace theories, speech which is within the ambit of first amend-
ment protection conceivably would be subject nevertheless to state regulation or pro-
hibition. See infra notes 212-225 and accompanying text.
5. According to Professor Schauer, the question of what speech is covered by
the first amendment is conceptually distinguishable from the issue of how much pro-
tection such speech should be accorded. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 275-76. See
also Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment.- Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267, 278. Nevertheless, there is a relation between the strength of
the protection afforded by the first amendment and its scope. Professor Schauer ar-
gues in support of subcategorizing speech that any commitment to grant full protec-
tion to all speech which falls within the first amendment is likely to cause judges to
restrict the scope of speech falling within the first amendment: "absolutism exerts an
inward pull on the boundaries of coverage." Schauer, supra note I, at 276.
6. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 290-92 (arguing that both commercial speech
and defamatory speech are appropriate subcategories deserving of less protection
than other speech).
7. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 447-54 (discussing cases where the Burger
Court has used ad hoc balancing as opposed to definitional balancing); Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time.- First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 938-41 (1968) (criticizing Supreme
Court's reliance on ad hoc balancing). Perhaps the most succinct articulation of an ad
hoc balancing approach is Mr. Justice Harlan's statement for the Court in Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959): "Where First Amendment rights are asserted to
bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by
the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular cir-
cumstances shown." Id. at 126. For one of the more vibrant defenses of ad hoc bal-
ancing, see Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment.- Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962). For an "eclectic approach" which relies on
categorical, ad hoc, and definitional balancing approaches depending on the context,
see Shiffrin, Government Speech, supra note 1.
8. See Nimmer, supra note 7, at 943-48.
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interest advanced in a particular case is irrelevant once it is deter-
mined that the speech in a particular case fits within a protected
speech category and within the contours of the protection af-
forded. Under a definitional balancing approach, the values un-
derlying the speech category must in each case be weighed against
the values served by the proffered state interest.9
As the above taxonomy indicates, one way to divide the cur-
rent state of first amendment theory is between absolutism and
balancing. Indeed, much of the debate has tracked this distinc-
tion, 10 which more than one commentator has found unfortu-
nate."I This dispute will not be pursued here; rather, this Article
seeks to group a series of first amendment theories under the ru-
bric "categorical approach" and suggests that this approach is in-
adequate. Particular absolutist or categorical theories of the first
amendment are often susceptible to any or all of the following
attacks: the categorical descriptions of protected speech include
too little or too much; the categories do not compel conclusions in
hard cases or, if they do, the conclusions are sometimes unaccept-
able; the categories are unintelligible, or to put it another way,
9. The distinction between non-absolutist categorical approaches and defini-
tional balancing may be more methodological than substantive: non-absolutist cate-
gorical approaches will take state interests into account in deciding what speech or
subcategories of speech should be protected and how much. See, e.g., Schauer, supra
note 1, at 290-93. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 583. In contrast to definitional
balancing, these state interests are characterized before the category or subcategory of
speech is established and the level of protection to be accorded is determined. Defini-
tional balancing, on the other hand, leaves open the possibility that the state will at
some point advance a state interest which would require the category or subcategory
of speech to be left unprotected or less protected. Thus, both non-absolutist categori-
cal approaches and definitional balancing will at some level of abstraction allow state
interests to be weighed on the scales.
The most significant difference appears to be that non-absolutist categorical ap-
proaches come up with rules protecting speech that are not subject to change should a
new interest be advanced by the state for regulating that type of speech. Definitional
balancing does not provide such a finished product: its rules remain subject to change
if the state interests asserted prove to be novel and substantially less compelling or
substantially more compelling than those state interests asserted in past balancing
acts.
10. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1113-17 (10th ed. 1980); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 695-701 (5th ed. 1980); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 582-83. Much of the substance
of the debate is contained in a series of scholarly exchanges between Mendelson and
Frantz. See Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-4 Reply to Professor Mendelson,
51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE
L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, supra note 7; Mendelson, The First Amendment and the
Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964).
I1. See Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
UCLA L. REV. 428, 441-44 (1967); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75, 77-81.
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they are impossible to apply in a concrete case. 12 Such attacks
may indicate merely that the failure of absolutist or categorical
approaches lies in the fact that the wrong categories are chosen. 13
It is the thesis of this Article, however, that the root of the difficul-
ties plaguing absolutist and categorical theories is to be found in
the categorical approach itself.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I seeks to establish
that all political philosophies implicitly or explicitly embody a
conception of what it means to be a human being. Political phi-
losophies differ markedly, however, in the extent to which they
attribute common needs, desires, and dispositions to human be-
ings, the extent to which these common characteristics can change,
and the level of abstraction with which these characteristics can be
described. Moreover, political philosophies differ in their assign-
ment of practical and normative significance to the common
needs, desires, and dispositions. In light of these differences, we
must confess an absence of secure knowledge concerning "human
nature."14
12. See Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association." An Expansion ofFreedom and Con-
traction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431 (1977):
Critics of ad hoc balancing have claimed that no predictable standards
emerge, that the scales tend to be tipped against the first amendment
because particular and often trivial expression rather than the general
value of freedom of expression, is weighed against competing social val-
ues, that the particularized focus tends to overlook the dynamics of how
restrictions on expression actually will be administered, and that the
absence of general rules leaves room for excessive judicial discretion in
individual cases. On the other side, defenders of ad hoc balancing have
argued that first amendment issues are too complex for categorical re-
sponses, that broad rules are brittle and will tend to generate categorical
exceptions, that categorical rules are disguises behind which judges co-
vertly engage in intuitive balancing, and that categorical guarantees in-
ject the Supreme Court too far into disputed questions of policy that
should be left to, or at least shared with, the democratic branches of
government.
Id. at 463-64.
13. For example, Meiklejohn's argument that the first amendment absolutely
protects only the realm of political speech, A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), has been attacked on the ground that it is
difficult to distinguish political from nonpolitical speech. See Chafee, Book Review,
62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 899-900 (1949). Meiklejohn's theory has been criticized be-
cause, if the term "political" is given any rigorous meaning, the term is not sufficiently
inclusive: literary, scientific, artistic, and other forms of speech are left unprotected.
Id. at 900. On the other hand, if all speech relevant to or supportive of political
speech is deemed to fall within the category of political speech, the theory unravels
and fails to provide an ascertainable distinction between protected and unprotected
speech. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra note 1, at 938. In and of
themselves, these criticisms of Meiklejohn's theory do not (and are not intended to)
indicate whether the failure of the theory stems from its categorical structure or the
substantive content of the theory. See generally infra notes 123-133 and accompany-
ing text.
14. Of course, we need not confess anything if we are committed to a particular
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In the face of skepticism concerning the breadth, scope, and
content of human nature, liberal political philosophy recognizes
the individual as essential and accords the individual certain pro-
tections vis-a-vis the collective. In Part II, it will be argued that
the "Premise of Individualism" underlying this recognition is in-
consistent with any attempt to describe the content and scope of
individual rights, such as the first amendment's protection of
speech, by means of a categorical approach.' 5 Part II describes
Rawlsian theory' 6 as representative of liberal political philosophy.
It is demonstrated that the Premise of Individualism leaves Rawl-
sian theory, and liberal political philosophy generally, with three
serious problems: 1) the inability to choose and define liberties;17
2) the inability to distinguish liberty from the means of its realiza-
tion;' 8 and 3) the absence of any satisfactory mediating principle
to relate abstract liberties to concrete social practices. 9 To the
extent that we want a broad arena in which individuals are to be
left alone to pursue their own ends, we must refrain from describ-
ing too concretely what those ends are. Similarly, we ought not to
be too surprised if the ends pursued vary greatly and cannot easily
be classified into categories which have both operational and nor-
mative significance.
Any satisfactory theory of freedom of speech must resolve, or
at least provide a means of dealing with, the three difficulties de-
scribed above. In Part III, I argue that the reason categorical ap-
proaches fail on this score is that they are fundamentally at odds
with the basic premise of liberal political thought: recognition of
the individual as essential and protection of the interests of indi-
viduals. Categorical approaches do violence to our concept of the
individual: they assume more commonality of needs, desires, and
dispositions than can be tolerated by the Premise of Individual-
ism. It is then suggested that if we are to remain in harmony with
the Premise of Individualism (and perhaps even if we are not), a
satisfactory attempt to identify the activities which constitute
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment must rely on
political philosophy which claims to know the content of the common needs, desires,
and dispositions of human beings as well as the significance of these common charac-
teristics for the political order. But, because no political philosophy seems to enjoy
intellectual hegemony, the adoption of a particular political philosophy for purposes
of describing a legitimate political order, including constitutional theory, is inherently
suspect. See infra text accompanying notes 22-35.
15. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76-100 (1975). See infra text
accompanying notes 36-61.
16. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 62-71.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 44-61.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
[Vol. 30:671
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at least four parameters: content, manner, source, and effect. 20
Part IV discusses the theories of Meiklejohn, Baker, Emerson,
and the Marketplace Theorists in an effort to demonstrate the in-
trinsic problems of categorical approaches to the first amendment.
Despite their flaws, these theories remain attractive, for each pro-
vides powerful insight on the relevance for freedom of speech of
one or more of the four parameters of speech: content, source,
manner, and effect. I use the theories to suggest that an acceptable
approach to the first amendment must take into acount no less
than these four parameters. In Part V, I conclude by laying
groundwork for an alternative approach to freedom of speech, an
approach which is not categorized.
I. THE PROBLEM OUTLINED: THE ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE
The failure of categorical theorists to present acceptable ap-
proaches to the first amendment is merely a symptom of more
general problems that confront liberal political philosophy. The
problems are rooted in the inability to establish a secure under-
standing of human nature and, therefore, to define satisfactorily
the scope of liberty that should be preserved for the individual.
All political philosophies can be seen as embodying a concep-
tion of "human nature," a set of human needs, desires, and dispo-
sitions.2 1 Political philosophies differ markedly, however, on the
extent to which needs, desires, and dispositions are shared.22
Political philosophies range from extremely "narrow" to very
20. One could, of course, develop a theory of freedom of speech which posits an
expansive definition of speech and focuses on the means or manner by which the state
can regulate or forbid such speech. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 576-98. Ulti-
mately, however, any comprehensive theory of the first amendment must have some
definition of what constitutes protected speech; such a definition cannot be established
simply by scrutinizing state regulation.
21. Some political theorists would bristle at this statement because they regard
the concept of "human nature" as the attribution of fixed characteristics to human
beings-an approach which they claim to reject. For example, some Marxists would
regard the concept of "human nature" as a hypostatization of human existence. They
would argue that human beings are a product of their historical circumstances, which
are themselves subject to change. See J. HYPPOLITE, STUDIES ON MARX AND HEGEL
132 (1969). I use the term "human nature" broadly, however, to include this Marxist
definition of what it means to be a human being. "Human nature" here refers to that
set of characteristics which human beings share and which are deemed by the particu-
lar political philosophy to be significant for the political, social, and economic order.
22. A few major differences may be noted. First, political philosophies differ in
their level of abstraction in describing the set of common needs, desires, and disposi-
tions. Second, they differ in the number and the content of the needs, desires, and
dispositions which are shared. Third, they differ in the normative significance they
attach to common needs, desires, and dispositions relative to those that are not
shared. Finally, they differ in the extent to which shared needs, desires, and disposi-
tions and those which are not shared are subject to change.
19831
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"broad" views of human nature. The paradigmatic narrow view
describes abstractly the set of common human characteristics to
include only a few common traits relative to those not shared and
attaches negative value to the traits shared relative to those which
are not.2 3 The paradigmatic broad view articulates a set of com-
mon characteristics, finds that they are significant relative to those
not shared, and claims that these common characteristics have
positive value relative to traits which are not shared.24
Adoption of a narrow view would seem to lead (though not
inexorably) to the view that the legitimate scope of state authority
is fairly minimal. This follows because, under the assumption that
the set of common characteristics is relatively small, not con-
cretely identifiable, and of relatively negative value, the import of
human existence lies in the individual's realization of his particu-
lar needs, desires, and dispositions. Therefore, the grant of signifi-
cant powers to the state can only frustrate the realization of the
multiplicity of particularized individual needs, desires, and dispo-
sitions. Under the narrow view, the value of social resources com-
mitted to producing "communal goods"25 will be slight since only
a limited societal consensus can be reached on which goods ought
to be produced. The role of the state is thus restricted to produc-
ing those communal goods deemed necessary for the pursuit of
individual aims. 26 In effect, the state's function is limited almost
exclusively to producing instrumental communal goods.2 7 Thus,
the narrow view leads to the introduction of a pervasive
ends/means distinction in the social fabric.28
23. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). Nozick, whose
political philosophy may appropriately be described as supremely individualistic,
concedes that all human beings have an interest in preserving their bodily integrity
and that therefore the state is justified in preventing destructive physical aggression.
24. See, e.g., R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 180-95 (1968).
25. By the term "communal good," I mean those goods produced by the state or
the collective that are not privately owned. The concept includes both those goods
which are owned by the state (e.g., toll bridges) and those goods which are not sub-
jected to appropriation by any party including the state (e.g., clean air).
26. Even in a minimalist state (i.e., a state premised on a highly individualistic
view of the human being), some communal goods will be produced. A minimalist
state will have to provide a system for adjudication of the conflicting rights of individ-
uals, for enforcement of those rights, and for protection from foreign aggression. See
R. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 26.
27. I am not using the term "instrumental" here in any formal philosophical
sense. The term "instrumental communal good" is intended to mean only that
neither the individuals nor the community values the good as an end; the good is
valued because it allows or facilitates the attainment of something else. See infra note
30 (defining "communal end good").
28. Under the narrow view, the state and other social institutions as well are
designed to provide instrumental goods which individuals can then co-opt for their
own ends. Under the broad view, ends are determined by the collective rather than
by the individual. Under the broad view, ends are universal and concrete, and social
[Vol. 30:671
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On the other hand, those political philosophies that take the
broad view of human nature are more likely to approve the allo-
cation of many choices to some form of collective decisionmak-
mng. 29 On the assumption that common needs, desires, and
dispositions are quantitatively, qualitatively, and normatively sig-
nificant, the state may legitimately engage in the production of
communal end goods.30 Indeed, the grant of individual liberties
to pursue any and all particularized individual goods is at once
unnecessary and undesirable. It is unnecessary to the extent that
human beings would seek the same goods privately that the state
would provide publicly. It is undesirable for a number of reasons.
First, it is probably more efficient for the state to provide the com-
munal end goods for all individuals than if all individuals were to
attempt to secure these goods privately and thus incur the transac-
tion costs, writ large, of the market. 31 Second, some goods can be
secured only by the state, either because it would be too costly for
individuals to seek to procure these goods privately (i.e., transac-
tion costs), 32 or because some goods can exist only as communal
goods (i.e., they cannot exist as private goods). 33 Finally, the
life need not be divided along the lines of ends and means unless, of course, the
distinction between ends and means has a metaphysical foundation (i.e., a foundation
which does not depend on how social life is organized).
29. One example of such an outlook would be Marxism. Marxism views the es-
sential characteristics of human nature as species being-the fact that man produces
his life in community with other human beings and thus has an overriding interest in
self-externalization through meaningful work. In the capitalist epoch, according to
Marx, the proletarian class holds within its life conditions (i.e., routinized work, de-
pendency, substitutability, etc.) the promise of realizing this species being. K. MARX,
THE ECONOMIC & PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 106-19 (D. Struik ed.
1964); M. MERLEAU-PONTY, HUMANISM AND TERROR 113-18 (1969).
30. A communal end good is a good appropriated by the state or not subject to
appropriation by anyone and which is valued as an end in itself by the community.
See supra note 27.
In suggesting that the state may legitimately engage in the production of commu-
nal end goods under the broad view, I have deliberately equated the "state" with the
"community"-a simplification which overlooks the possibility (not central to the ar-
gument here) that the community might provide communal end goods without par-
taking of the attributes of a state.
31. By speaking of "transaction costs, writ large," I mean to expand the set of
costs that the law and economics school would identify as "transaction costs." For
instance, some would argue that there are "psychic" and "interpersonal" costs associ-
ated with the very fact of relating to others through a free market or through the
lenses of a free market mentality. For a description of these "transaction costs," see
infra note 33.
32. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
33. Included within this class are all goods which might be considered as incon-
sistent with the operation of the market, e.g., a community of meaningful work or
strict equality. These goods cannot be sold on the market without being transformed
into something inconsistent with their original content. Furthermore, the market has
the effect of altering values, needs, and aspirations such that individuals may tend not
to seek certain types of goods in a market economy. See generally M. HORKHEIMER,
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grant of full individual liberties to pursue particularized individ-
ual goods is undesirable because the grant in effect would permit
pathological individuals to frustrate, and perhaps even to deny,
the achievement of communal end goods. 34
Political philosophies may thus be distinguished by their de-
termination of the needs, desires, and dispositions which human
beings share in common. This determination informs the relation
between the state and the individual. If the set of common needs,
desires, and dispositions is known, a broad grant of absolute rights
gives individuals free rein to act in such a manner as to preclude
the possibility of realizing this human essence. Consequently, the
state would be justified in taking an interventionist stance towards
those individuals who, by their actions, would threaten the reali-
zation of communal interests. To the extent, however, that the
state engages in the production of communal end goods that go
beyond those shared needs, desires, and dispositions and corre-
spondingly curtails individual liberty, the state begins to assume
an unjustified totalitarian character.35 Thus, unless one is com-
mitted to a determinate view of human nature, the, grant of a
broad set of absolute liberties constraining state action on the one
hand, the relegation of all decisions to a collective decision-mak-
ing process on the other, and all points on the spectrum in be-
tween are suspect.
II. CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
In the absence of secure knowledge concerning the extent to
which human interests are shared, liberal political philosophers 36
take a "middle course," allowing some collective decisionmaking
ECLIPSE OF REASON 97-102 (1974); H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION 11
(1969); H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 9-18 (1964). Therefore, the operation
of a market is hardly costless: it eliminates certain goods and, by promoting or deni-
grating certain values, it causes individuals to reject certain types of goods.
34. If the content of communal end goods can be known, it may be counter-
productive to allow individuals any freedom to interfere with the achievement of
these communal end goods. This explains why some Marxists would reject adherence
to "bourgeois liberties" during the formative years of socialism. See V. LENIN, STATE
AND REVOLUTION 7-20 (1932).
35. The state is totalitarian because it regulates aspects of life beyond any legiti-
mate claim of state concern. For one who believes that only a minimalist state is
justified, a liberal democracy may well appear totalitarian in many respects. See
supra note 26.
36. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (T. Peardon ed.
1952). The paramount recent example of liberal political philosophy is J. RAWLS,
supra note 16. See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Excluded
are utilitarians, whose conclusions can theoretically run the gamut from extreme indi-
vidualism to totalitarianism. There is nothing in the utilitarian perspective which
places a transcendent value on the individual or protects individualism from total
denigration where utility would require such denigration.
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while preserving broad areas of individual choice. Thus, liberal
political philosophy is grounded on the premise that the state
ought to leave individuals alone to establish and pursue their ends
and values,3 7 a position I call the "Premise of Individualism."
This position may be based on the view that the set of needs,
desires, and dispositions shared by human beings is limited. Al-
ternatively, it may be based on the view that, to the extent shared
needs, desires, and dispositions cannot be determined, a broad
realm of individual choice must be preserved in order to allow
common interests, if any, to be revealed. 38
From the Premise of Individualism, liberal political thought
typically effectuates a divorce between a concept of formal nega-
tive liberty39 and the means to realize this liberty.40 If the individ-
37. See R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 76-100. Dworkin writes that the Rawlsian
theory is based not on an individual right to liberty, but on the view "that [individu-
als] have a right to equal respect and concern in the design of political institutions."
R. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 182. The point is that both Rawls and Dworkin take
the individual seriously and premise their conclusions on a concept of the individual
as worthy of respect. Id. at 184-205; J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 19.
38. For instance, Professor Tribe has suggested that an acceptable first amend-
ment theory must prescribe a freedom of speech which would allow the collective to
remain rooted in capitalism or to develop into a more communitarian state. Tribe,
supra note 1, at 239-40.
To the extent that the scope of the first amendment freedom of speech is
grounded on the prudential concern of allowing maximum options for human beings
in the face of uncertain human nature, we can understand the liberal interest in polit-
ical speech: political speech addresses itself specifically to eliminating our ignorance
about the extent to which needs, desires, and dispositions are shared-both in the
sense of headcounting and in the sense of acquiring and communicating the learning
on the matter. Of course, in order to determine what political speech might mean in
this context, one would have to advance a normative view of the scope and content of
the political realm. A liberal democratic conception of political speech is thus prob-
lematic. See Baker, Process of Change, supra note 1.
39. The liberty is formal in the sense that its formulation and application are
presented as being unrelated to the particular uses and purposes the liberty will serve
for particular individuals or groups. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126
(1961). The liberty is negative because it proscribes state interference or coercion
without guaranteeing that the liberty may be exercised by all or even most individu-
als. The distinctions between positive and negative liberty are explored in 1. BERLIN,
Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958). It is worth noting that Berlin's distinction be-
tween negative liberty (in the sense of absence of constraints) and positive liberty (in
the sense of freedom to do X or conscious self-direction) has been attacked on the
grounds that the distinction rests on an artificially limited view of what can count as a
constraint. See J. FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 5
(1980); C. MACPHERSON, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: Es-
SAYS IN RETRIEVAL 95 (1973).
40. The "means to realize liberty" are tentatively defined here as those means
necessary for a meaningful exercise of the liberty. Ultimately, this Article suggests
that a principled distinction between liberty and the means to realize liberty is not
possible. See infra text accompanying notes 44-61.
Marx's critique of the liberal democratic state as establishing an alienated form
of life sets forth the divorce of formal negative liberty from the means of its realiza-
tion. See K. MARX, On the Jewish Question, in 3 KARL MARX, FREDERICK ENGELS,
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ual is to be left free in large measure to choose her own ends, the
state must guarantee an arena where the individual will be free
from interference. Liberty is defined formally because it must be
defined independently of the multiplicity of different values held
by individuals.4' Similarly, liberty is defined negatively because
the multiplicity of different individual values precludes the state
from guaranteeing or providing for the realization of all of these
values. In divorcing formal negative liberty and the means of its
realization, liberal political philosophy accords liberty a superior
position. These two crucial steps lead to a number of difficulties.42
In order to illustrate these difficulties, the following sections will
examine the arguments in John Rawls' treatise, A Theory of
Justice .43
A. The Primacy of Liberty Over the Means to Realize Liberty
The starting point in Rawls' theory is the "original posi-
tion"-a hypothetical situation where an individual is ascribed
certain needs or interests and deprived of information concerning
his position in society.44 In the original position, individuals do
not know what particular ends they will want to pursue in the real
world, but they do know that they want certain "primary goods,"
including liberty, opportunity, income, wealth, and the bases of
self-respect.4 5  Further, individuals in the original position are
"mutually disinterested," that is, they are conceived as not taking
an interest in one another's interests. 46 On the basis of this hypo-
thetical situation, Rawls derives the fundamental principles that
an individual pursuing his self-interest would adopt to govern the
distribution of primary goods in a just society.4 7
COLLECTED WORKS 148, 165-66 (1975); see also J. HYPPOUTE, supra note 21, at
106-25 (reviewing Marx's critique of the Hegelian concept of the state).
41. See R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 85.
42. For a discussion of this thesis, see Baker, Process of Change, supra note 1.
43. J. RAWLS, supra note 16. I have chosen Rawls as a point of departure because
his work represents one of the most compelling and comprehensive statements of lib-
eral political philosophy.
44. Id. at 118-83.
45. "The argument for the two [Rawlsian] principles of justice does not assume
that the parties have particular ends, but only that they desire certain primary goods."
Id. at 253. The two Rawlsian principles of justice are set forth id. at 302. For an
argument that the Marxian good of "meaningful work" should be included as a pri-
mary good in the original position and would alter the principles to be adopted, see
Eshete, Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice, 85 ETHICS 38 (1974).
46. J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 13.
47. The attraction of this style of argument lies in the fact that it assumes little
about the good life or what human beings are like, and it does not exclude any sector
or class of the population. Thus, if one admits that the original position constitutes a
fair, albeit abstract, characterization of what it is like to be a human being, then, so
the argument goes, one is forced to accept the choices made by a person in the origi-
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Significantly, in the original position, liberty is distinguished
from and given a more exalted status than other primary goods
such as wealth or income.48 The prioritization of liberty stems
from the conclusion that liberty is absolutely essential to self-de-
termination and to the pursuit of an individual's rational plan of
life.49 This prioritization thus reflects a concern very much like
the Premise of Individualism. Indeed, Rawls' assumption that in-
dividuals in the original position are "mutually disinterested"
would be required by the Premise of Individualism, and it is this
assumption that permits the emergence of liberty as distinct from
and superior to the other primary goods.50
Even if one concedes that liberty should have priority over
nal position as one's own. Contra Dworkin, The OriginalPosition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
500 (1973); Fisk, History and Reason in Rawls' Moral Theory, in READING RAWLS 53
(N. Daniels ed. 1975)[hereinafter cited as Fisk, History and Reason].
48. The divorce of liberty from the means of its realization (i.e., the other pri-
mary goods such as wealth and income) is evident in the fact that each is to be distrib-
uted according to two different principles. Roughly stated, liberty is to be distributed
in an egalitarian manner and may be restricted only for the sake of liberty, whereas
the other primary goods are to be distributed to maximize the position of the least
advantaged. For a more accurate and complete statement of the principles of justice,
see J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 302-03.
49. Now the basis for the priority of liberty is roughly as follows: as the
conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance for our
good of further economic and social advantages diminishes relative to
the interests of liberty, which become stronger as the conditions for the
exercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized.
Id. at 542. Rawls has been widely criticized for this conclusion. See, e.g., B. BARRY,
THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 59-82 (1973); R. Wolff, The Priority of Liberty and
Other Complications, in UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRI-
TIQUE OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-116 (1977); Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Prior-
ity, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 534 (1973).
Rawls has sought to defend himself. Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 PHIL. REV.
536, 540-47 (1975). In large part, Rawls' defense rests on the assumption of certain
psychological and sociological truths. He states:
Effective arguments for the conclusion that the account of primary
goods is individualistic would have to show at least the following: first,
that in a well-ordered society effectively regulated by the principles of
justice people would acquire and pursue individualistic ways of life
.... Second, one must show that the reason for these results is the
account of primary goods.
Id. at 544. This answer seems to be just a burden of proof argument about whose
psychology and sociology we will use-the liberal's or the radical's.
50. Rawls' assumption of mutual disinterest is problematic. J. RAWLS, supra note
16, at 136-50. Individuals are influenced by other people. What other people are like
and how the world is produced are hardly matters of indifference to most individuals;
participation in a community is a good in itself. See Eshete, supra note 45, at 47
(suggesting that a community of meaningful, productive work is a good). A counter-
argument would be that Rawls' theory in no way impairs the right of voluntary asso-
ciation. This counterargument misses the mark because the way in which society is
organized will have a great effect upon what sorts of voluntary associations are possi-
ble, what these voluntary associations are like, and who can join. See Fisk, History
and Reason, supra note 47, at 64-67 (noting Hegel's observation that because contrac-
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other primary goods, a principled distinction between liberty and
the means of its realization is problematic. Rawls defines liberty
negatively by the following formula: "[T]his or that person (or
persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint to do (or
not to do) so and so."' 1
Rawls considers that deprivations such as poverty, ignorance,
and the like do not affect liberty, but rather the "worth of liberty,"
the value that liberties may have for particular individuals.5 2
Thus, the fact that a person may be incapable of exercising any
liberty because he lacks the means to do so does not, for Rawls,
signify a deprivation of liberty. Rawls fails to support this view,
and his distinction between liberty and the means to realize liberty
remains unjustified and arbitrary.53
The absence of a justification for drawing a distinction be-
tween liberty and the means of its realization and the absence of
support for the particular content Rawls attributes to the two
prongs of the distinction impairs his conclusions regarding the
proper distribution of primary goods.54 Indeed, because Rawls
concludes that liberty is to take priority over, and is to be distrib-
uted differently from, other primary goods, it is essential that a
principled basis be articulated to distinguish liberty from the
means of its realization.
tualists start with the ultimacy of choice of mutually disinterested individuals, the
ideal of union cannot advance beyond civil society).
In defense of Rawls, it may be noted that if he had posited strict egoism or per-
fect altruism as psychological dispositions in the original position, the question of
justice could not arise. See Eshete, supra note 45, at 39. The assumption of mutual
disinterest nevertheless remains problematic insofar as it ultimately discounts the
value of those goods which are related to or can only be attained in community. And,
as Eshete shows, Rawls' definition of the primary goods to be distributed according to
the principles of justice fails to take into account meaningful work and thus leads
away from a communitarian perspective.
51. J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 202. On the definition of "negative liberty," see
supra note 39.
52. J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 204 (defining the worth of liberty).
53. It is unjustified in the sense that absent a reason supporting the distinction,
the distinction ought not to be made. It is arbitrary in the sense that even if there is a
reason to draw the distinction somewhere, there is no reason to draw the line where
Rawls does.
Rawls' failure to provide an acceptable distinction between liberty and the means
to realize liberty leaves his theory incomplete. Further, it is not clear, given Rawls'
fuzzy definition of the term "constraint," whether a given deprivation can be counted
as a constraint on liberty or must be analogized to ignorance and poverty and thus
treated simply as the absence of the means to realize liberty.
54. Were it not for Rawls' assertion that poverty does not count as a constraint
on liberty, it would be possible to translate wealth and income allotments into liberty
interests. Rawls must, of course, maintain that poverty cannot count as a constraint
on liberty, for if he failed to do so, there might not be any distinction between liberty
and the other primary goods and certainly no basis for suggesting that liberty is to
have exalted status relative to the other primary goods.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Other liberal political philosophers share Rawls' assignment
of a superior position to liberty relative to the means of its realiza-
tion.55 The crucial question thus becomes: Is liberal political phi-
losophy capable of furnishing an acceptable distinction between
liberty and the means of its realization? No. The Premise of Indi-
vidualism underlying liberal political philosophy is that individu-
als ought to be left alone to pursue their own ends. If the
distinction between liberty and the means to realize liberty is
based upon a vision, however abstract, of what constitutes the
good life, then we would in effect be preferring the values and
ends of certain individuals to the detriment of others.5 6 Thus, an
acceptable distinction would have to be value neutral: one could,
of course, attempt to draw the distinction by articulating the relm
of deprivations for which the state is not accountable.
Thus formulated, the task appears impossible. The task is
basically one of attributing to various entities accountability for
deprivations impacting upon an individual. Four different types
of entities might be described: the state, the natural order, the
individual, and the cultural order (i.e., institutions which mediate
among the three, such as the church, the family, the market, etc.).
When considering the distinction between liberty and the
means to realize liberty, it is clear that only those deprivations
which the individual imposes on herself can be considered depri-
vations of-the means to realize liberty; all other deprivations are
arguably attributable at least in part to the state and might thus
logically be considered constraints on liberty. Clearly, depriva-
tions imposed by the state are constraints on liberty. Likewise,
deprivations which on a superficial level appear to be imposed by
the natural order might be attributable to the state to the extent
that the state could act to remove the harmful or constraining con-
sequences apparently stemming from the natural order.5 7 Simi-
55. Within the liberal tradition, liberty has always been assigned an espe-
cially fundamental place. . . . [I]n Locke's political philosophy, basic
rights were rights to liberty from interference by others. Nozick's con-
temporary libertarianism seems to recognize only the right to negative
liberty. Even those whose work defends economic redistribution, writ-
ers such as Rawls and Tawney, either give priority to liberty or argue
that economic equality contributes to greater liberty.
N. BOWIE & R. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 182 (1977).
56. Ironically, it is because the Premise of Individualism demands value neutral-
ity that the liberal conception of justice is a "formal" one: the definition of liberty is
not predicated upon an explicit recognition of the purposes it will serve for the indi-
vidual actor or the value or significance it has for her. See R. UNGER, supra note 15,
at 83-88.
57. See J. PENNOCK, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ITS MERITS AND PROSPECTS 60-61
(1978). Pennock argues that the absence of natural endowment serves as an absolute
limit to the enlargement of what constitutes absence of restraint because natural en-
dowment is not subject to human control and should not count as a restraint. Even
1983]
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larly, deprivations which on a superficial level appear to be
imposed by social institutions such as the family could, arguably,
be removed by the state. Thus, if the state is not held accountable
for deprivations which appear to stem from the natural order or
the cultural order, it is either because we believe that the state
could not do anything about them in any case or because we be-
lieve that these deprivations are more properly attributable to en-
tities other than the state. But what informs such conclusions?
Given that human experience does not divide neatly in terms of
these four entities, deprivations often seem to result from the com-
bination of actions or omissions of the four types of entities.
An appeal to the social sciences for a causal framework
which would permit attribution of deprivations to one of the four
entities is inconsistent with the Premise of Individualism and its
requirement of value neutrality. First, causal explanations cannot
identify which of the four entities is accountable for a deprivation
because the very concept of causation in the social sciences re-
quires an appeal to value judgments. The identification or defini-
tion of causal agents as well as the choice of a particular theory of
causation are value laden. Second, the concept of deprivation it-
self is value laden. Even if one could find a causal chain connect-
ing the state to some deprivation, one would have to furnish some
reason for thinking that the deprivation is indeed a deprivation-
again a value judgment violative of the Premise of Individualism.
The Premise of Individualism conflicts with the attempt to
identify a causal realm distinguishable from individual self-direc-
tion for a third reason. What may be an external force con-
straining an individual today may be the result of free, self-
directed choices made by individuals in previous generations. For
instance, the first generation may deem that ownership of private
property ought to be protected as a liberty, and, for that genera-
tion, private property may represent self-directed activity. For
succeeding generations, however, private property is an institution
that has acquired the weight of history. It thus becomes difficult
to determine whether a liberty to hold private property represents
self-directed activity or simply the choices made by generations
past, choices that constrain the present generation. Here, liberal
political philosophy cannot curtail the liberty to hold private
property established by past generations simply because such a
liberty may have a constraining external effect on future genera-
tions; on the other hand, future generations ought not to be con-
on this score, however, the political order arguably can be structured to remove re-
straints "stemming" from the absence of natural endowments: we can restructure




strained by choices made by dead generations--choices which
have acquired the force of history. 58
In the face of these quandaries, liberal political philosophy is
without satisfactory answers. In terms of its prescriptive content
for the organization of society, liberal political philosophy adopts
an "historical agnosticism" and refuses to attach significant ac-
countability to the political order for the deprivations to which
individuals are subjected. Correspondingly, liberal political phi-
losophy refuses to attach much weight to the causal realm relative
to individual self-direction. These two positions follow from the
Premise of Individualism in that individuals must be able to deter-
mine their own ends and values. The concept of deprivation must
thus be construed narrowly, and attribution of accountability for
deprivations to the state must be minimized. This is a political
stance, however, not a principle which allows us to distinguish lib-
erty from the means of its realization.
It might be argued that liberal political philosophy can avoid
the dilemma of distinguishing liberty from the means to realize
liberty by prescribing that social resources be primarily devoted to
removing the "most serious" constraints. Even if liberal political
philosophy is incapable of precisely defining the relative limits of
free choice and historical conditioning and the relative limits of
liberty and the means to realize liberty, decisions can nevertheless
be made at the cores of each of these concepts.
This response begs the question. In a world of "moderate
scarcity," how much of our social resources should the political
order commit to removing those "most serious" constraints? 59 If
all social resources are committed to removing constraints, ram-
pant poverty will itself constitute a serious constraint on liberty.
Liberal political philosophy must, therefore, assign a "stopping
point" for the expenditure of social resources to maximize liberty.
58. How much of our cultural heritage concerning sexual identity or preferences,
for instance, can be forced upon the present generation? The Premise of Individual-
ism sets forth the two extreme positions of this problem. One position is that individ-
uals ought to be free from any discrimination based upon sex, and the state should
therefore devote social resources to eliminate all private prejudices. Conversely, indi-
viduals ought to be left alone to determine their own values and place their own
significance on sexual identity and preference. But this means that individuals should
be both free to adopt the sexual roles embedded in the culture and likewise free from
any cultural imposition of cultural roles. The divergence between these two positions,
both of which derive from the Premise of Individualism, exemplify a common conflict
in liberal political analysis.
59. Rawls defines moderate scarcity in the following way: "Natural and other
resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor
are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down. While mu-
tually advantageous arrangements are feasible, the benefits they yield fall short of the
demands men put forward." J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 127.
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Furthermore, in a world of moderate scarcity, some choice will
have to be made about which constraints are "most serious."
Which ones will they be? The ones that are cheapest to remove?
The ones that affect the most individuals? The ones that are most
unfair or most debilitating? These are not value-neutral criteria.60
An attempt to choose among them by reference to some con-
ception of equal treatment must also fail. The attempt to draw a
distinction between liberty and the means to realize liberty on the
basis of some equality principle is problematic inasmuch as the
choice of a conception of equal treatment (e.g., outcome, process,
opportunity, etc.) would itself require an understanding of which
of the four entities is accountable for the deprivations facing
individuals.61
B. Which Liberties to Choose?
Even if it were possible to distinguish liberty from the means
of its realization and to determine the proper amount of social
resources to devote to liberty, liberal political philosophers face
the difficulty of determining which liberties ought to take prece-
dence over others.62 The problem is that almost any interest can
60. Rawls' theory does offer a limiting principle to determine the point where a
social system should stop attempting to maximize liberty and begin to focus attention
on the production of other goods such as wealth, income, and self-respect. One limit
is that the parties to the original position do not know which generation they will
belong to. Id. at 137, 292. The Rawlsian system thus imposes justice between genera-
tions: the amount of savings that each generation must maintain is determined on the
basis of sentimental interests in family lines:
What is essential is that each person in the original position should care
about the well-being of some of those in the next generation, it being
presumed that their concern is for different individuals in each case.
Moreover for anyone in the next generation, there is someone who
cares about him in the present generation. Thus the interests of all are
looked after and, given the veil of ignorance, the whole strand is tied
together.
Id. at 128-29. This standard is instructive, to some degree, on the savings that are
required between generations to insure the continued production of all goods, i.e.,
liberty and the means to realize liberty. It hardly addresses the issue of how much
may be spent in each generation on maximization of liberty relative to other goods; it
tells us nothing about the appropriate mix.
61. For a controversial argument that the concept of equality is a tautology with-
out substantive moral content of its own and confusing in nature, see Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Wes-
ten, The Empty Idea]. Contra Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas'" Logical Positivist
Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); contra Westen, On "Confus-
ingIdeas" Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153 (1982).
62. Proposed restrictions on liberty can always be framed as clashes of
different liberties, and there will always be those who will argue for
them in perfect good faith as enhancing more basic liberties. A theory
which proposes to resolve such clashes by enjoining us to maximize the
whole system of liberties must give us some criterion for preferring one
liberty to another. I find no such criterion in Rawls' theory of liberty,
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be framed as a liberty interest. 63 Given that liberties collide, some
principle must be found to enable a choice between competing
liberties. Rawls suggests that we should look at the system of lib-
erty as a totality.64 In other words, certain liberties tend to go
together: it would be, if not inconsistent, at least undesirable, to
grant freedom of political speech, for instance, without also grant-
ing liberty of conscience. 65 Rawls' suggested "total perspective" is
not a principle that compels or even helps determine which liber-
ties ought to be chosen. One can concede that liberties tend to go
together, that they form discrete sets, but that does not help us
choose between alternative sets of liberties.66 There are two well-
known means by which liberties or sets of liberties can be chosen:
some form of utilitarianism or a majoritarian principle. 67 Both
are objectionable.
1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism assumes that existing tastes and desires are the
proper starting point for social decisionmaking. Thus, a utilita-
rian perspective is essentially status-quo oriented. 68 It may be,
however, that in some historical periods, it is necessary in utilita-
either in his general remarks or in his argument for liberty of
conscience.
Grey, The First Virtue, 25 STAN. L. REV. 286, 316 (1973).
63. Id.
64. In choosing liberties, we are to choose "the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties." J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 302.
65. To choose liberties which tend to impair each other would seem to violate the
imperative of choosing the most extensive system of liberties. Indeed, liberties can
cancel each other out completely: for instance, religious tolerance seems diametri-
cally opposed to the free exercise of religion, to the extent that free exercise involves
the persecution of heretics. See Grey, supra note 62, at 312-14.
66. See id. at 3 10. Moreover, Rawls provides no criteria concerning the level of
abstraction at which we are to operate. For instance, in choosing liberties are we to
weigh the virtues of freedom of speech relative to other liberties, or are we to subdi-
vide further and consider the virtues of political speech and literary speech vis-a-vis
each other and vis-a-vis other liberties?
67. Although Rawls does suggest that an appropriate set of basic liberties would
include some of the constitutional liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
conscience, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure, he provides no satisfactory
account demonstrating which liberties should be chosen and which should not. See
Hart, supra note 49, at 541-42; Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
1020, 1036-37 (1973).
68. [U]tility analysis, because of its reliance on some given set of prefer-
ences-e.g., existing preferences-does not provide a solid standpoint
for evaluating self-determination related decisions, decisions about
what preferences one ought to have or will have in the future. The
circularity of relying on existing preferences is obvious; the bias in favor
of existing preferences, which have no intrinsic quality justifying their
being the dominant concern, is equally obvious.
Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381,
415 (1978).
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rian terms to devote a certain amount of social resources to chang-
ing existing preferences. 69 If this possibility is recognized, then
utilitarianism as a principle loses much of its appeal: there is no
longer a fixed point from which utilitarian methodology can pro-
ceed, and depending upon the fixed point from which utilitarian
methodology is applied, it may compel different conclusions.
Thus, utilitarianism fails as a principle because it does not compel
any conclusions. The answers provided by utilitarianism are
smuggled into the questions asked of it.
2. Majoritarianism
Majoritarianism embodies the same flaws intrinsic to utilita-
rianism. A majoritarian principle would dictate that the majority
view should prevail in choosing defined liberties. Like utilitarian-
ism, the majoritarian principle is heavily biased in favor of the
status quo. Letting majority opinion choose liberties allows it to
control and withhold those liberties that may be essential for the
development and ultimate acceptance of a minority viewpoint.70
Like utilitarianism, a majoritarian approach to liberty does not
permit any examination of whether existing preferences provide
an adequate starting point for the application of the majoritarian
approach. Thus, like utilitarianism, the majoritarian approach to
choosing liberties ultimately depends on the conviction that the
application of a majoritarian principle to existing preferences will
be beneficial.7'
C. Providing a Mediating Principle to Relate Abstract Liberties
to Concrete Social Practices
Even if liberal political philosophy could adequately ascer-
69. It is certainly conceivable that using existing preferences as a fixed point and
applying utilitarian analysis from this fixed point would lead to a destructive scenario
in the long run. For instance, if existing preferences are racist, it is conceivable that a
meticulous application of utilitarian principles would be harmful.
70. One of the paradoxes of the first amendment is that the majority defines the
limits of the speech rights enjoyed by individuals who are or whose views are antago-
nistic to the interest of the majority. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra
note 1, at 958. See also Bork, supra note 1, at 3. Categorical theorists rely on this
point to argue that categorical rules are necessary to counter the majoritarian bias
likely to be exhibited by judges in first amendment cases. See, e.g., T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53-56 (1966). For a
counterargument, see infra Part V (intellectual self-justification serves as a constraint
on majoritarian adjudication).
71. If we discard both majoritarianism and utilitarianism, we are left with pre-
cious little basis for decisionmaking. The most obvious alternative is "the minimalist
approach" discussed infra text accompanying notes 96-97. The Rawlsian "difference
principle," which governs the allocation of goods such as wealth, income, and self-
respect, is a type of minimalist principle in that it seeks to maximize the position of
the least favored member of society. See J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 302-03.
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tain the relative importance of liberties, it would still be necessary
to provide some mediating principle to connect the abstract liberty
to its real world forms. For instance, if we believe that commer-
cial speech ought to be protected because it leads to self-realiza-
tion, then we must find an operational or descriptive category of
speech which corresponds fairly well to the types of commercial
speech which lead to self-realization. It is not sufficient to define a
liberty that ought to be granted protection if this liberty does not
correspond to readily identifiable social practices. A mediating
principle thus serves to relate a normative category to an opera-
tional category. 72 It would be too much to ask for perfect corre-
spondence between a normative and an operational category. On
the other hand, it would hardly be improper to criticize a theory
on the grounds that its normative categories deviate too much
from available operational categories. Can liberal political philos-
ophy provide a mediating principle *to determine whether a given
activity falls within a defined liberty?
In accordance with the Premise of Individualism, the formal
character of liberty precludes recourse to the individual's motiva-
tion or to the particular value or purpose the individual attaches
to his activity. One alternative for liberal political philosophy
would be to determine whether a liberty interest (e.g., freedom of
speech) protects a particular social practice (e.g., advertising, pam-
phleteering, outdoor concerts, etc.). If various social practices
could be determined to fall inside or outside the liberty interest,
then liberal political philosophy would be able to define a liberty
such that its normative scope coincides with real world forms.
This solution does not work for two reasons. First, there is no
guarantee that actual social practices will correspond to the nor-
mative scope of defined liberties. For example, it is quite possible
that half of all advertising contributes to a first amendment value,
such as self-realization, while the other half does not. While we
may be able to suggest a normative distinction between these two
halves, there is no guarantee that when we turn to the real world
72. On the definition of normative and operational categories, see infra note 93
and accompanying text.
The "chilling effect" doctrine in the first amendment area is in part predicated on
the recognized absence of perfect correspondence between normative categories and
operational categories. The first amendment protects some speech not because it is
deserving of protection but because attempts to grant or deny protection strictly in
terms of whether the speech should or should not be protected might err and fail to
grant protection to speech which ought to be protected. Another rationale would
phrase the chilling effect problem not in terms of judicial error but rather in terms of
errors by potential speakers who would shun speech which, although protected, comes
dangerously close to the edge of unprotected speech. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment." Unraveling. the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 694-98
(1978).
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we can meaningfully distinguish the two. Second, because liberal
political philosophy leaves individuals alone to pursue their own
ends and values, it is unlikely that a given social practice serves a
homogeneous normative value. The value attached to a social
practice differs depending on the individual's values and ends;
there is no necessary transcendent value which attaches to any so-
cial practice.7 3 Moreover, given that liberal political philosophy
refuses to subject the bulk of social experience to collective deci-
sionmaking and that individuals place a manifold of different and
often conflicting values on the same social practices, any connec-
tion between a particular social practice and liberty becomes, as a
practical matter, exceedingly problematic. 74
A mediating principle is required of a theory purporting to
define freedom of speech by reference to any abstract categories of
protected speech precisely because there is no necessary corre-
spondence between the normative definition of liberties and social
practices. The question is not whether judges ought to be allowed
discretion in making judgments; clearly, this is unavoidable. 75
Rather, the question is whether it is legitimate and possible to con-
strain judicial discretion by means of abstract, categorical descrip-
tions of protected realms of speech.76
The absence of any satisfactory mediating principle in a lib-
73. One cannot say that advertising inherently contributes to self-realization, for
example, unless one views commodity consumption or purchase as an aspect of self-
realization-a view that may well be wrong.
74. This conclusion seems to be true not only for liberal political philosophy, but
for Marxian and other left-wing perspectives as well. See, e.g., the discussion of
Baker's theory, infra notes 148-165.
75. R. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 31-39.
76. Both majoritarianism and utilitarianism might be offered as mediating prin-
ciples, but this is a completely paradoxical suggestion. Suppose, for instance, that it is
agreed that the first amendment should protect only political speech. Using a utilita-
rian approach, however, to decide whether particular acts constitute political speech
would in effect result in the subversion of the category of political speech: the cate-
gory of political speech would become meaningless to the extent that it would be
considered worthwhile in some circumstances to treat acts which do not involve polit-
ical speech as political speech. The meaning of a defined liberty in concrete cases will
be governed by the consequences that the meaning will have. The meaning of a lib-
erty thus degenerates into a slogan.
The use of a majoritarian mediating principle may accomplish the same subver-
sion of meaning. The meaning of a given liberty would be subject to the determina-
tions of the majority. Significantly, to rely on a majoritarian principle to determine
which concrete social practices are instances of protected liberty would diminish the
role of courts in first amendment cases-unless, of course, one rejects the common
assumption that our political system is by and large democratic and by and large
represents the will of the majority. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-
AndIts Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 241-46 (1981) (criticizing John Hart Ely, J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), and Jesse Choper, J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980)), for resting their theories on an un-
realistic characterization of American political life as democratic).
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eral theory of liberty thus leaves normative categories of protected
activity which cannot easily be related to real world forms. With-
out a mediating principle, it will be impossible in many cases to
determine whether a given social practice engages the liberty in-
terest so as to warrant protection.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE DIFFICULTIES INTRINSIC TO LIBERAL
POLITICAL THOUGHT ON FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
The argument thus far can be summarized as follows. 1) In
the uncertainty concerning the breadth, content, and scope of
human nature, liberal political philosophers take a "middle
course" which recognizes that a limited number of abstract needs,
desires, and dispositions are shared, but in essence adheres to the
Premise of Individualism. 2) This approach yields a distinction
between a negative conception of formal liberty and the means to
realize liberty. 3) This approach leaves three basic problems un-
resolved: a) Which liberties to choose and their priority ranking;
b) A principle distinguishing liberty from the means of its realiza-
tion; and c) A mediating principle to relate abstract liberties to
concrete social practices.
A satisfactory first amendment theory must confront these
three issues. As will be seen, categorical theories fail because they
are too abstract and too reductionist to delineate the boundaries
between the rights of individuals vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis
the collective. In essence, categorical approaches do violence to
the Premise of Individualism.
A. Choosing and Ranking the Speech Liberties
Almost all justifications advanced for freedom of speech fall
within two camps. One view justifies freedom of speech as an es-
sential attribute of the individual.77 The other justifies freedom of
speech on instrumental grounds as a means to some end.78
77. I refer here to only those theories that hold that freedom of speech is an
essential aspect of the autonomy or integrity of individuals. Those theories holding
that freedom of speech is good for individuals or that freedom of speech promotes
autonomy and integrity are instrumental justifications for freedom of speech.
78. Some who argue that the first amendment protects political speech might fall
within the instrumentalist camp. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 1, at 23 (arguing that
freedom of political speech is essential to representative democracy). The view of the
first amendment as protecting a marketplace of ideas and thereby promoting truth
might also be called an instrumentalist conception. For a discussion of instrumental-





There is a sense in which freedom of speech can best be char-
acterized as a part of con-titutional safeguards that permit the
existence of the individual: along with other constitutional provi-
sions, the first amendment grants certain freedoms designed to
preserve the notion of the individual as the relevant political unit.
These freedoms are designed to give each individual a certain de-
gree of autonomy, recognizing that without this constitutional
commitment to non-interference with personal autonomy, the in-
dividual would cease to exist as an individual. If individuality is
viewed as an end in itself, then the state must recognize a limited
arena in which the human being can externalize herself in ways
which are within her control.
2. A means to an end
While the basic freedoms protected in the Bill of Rights are to
some extent founded on what it means to be an individual, they
are also grounded on instrumental concerns. These freedoms are
important because of the good effects they have on the collective
welfare or the good effects they have for individuals. Hence, we
have theories of the first amendment based on the marketplace
analogy, on participation in the political process, and on promo-
tion of the individual exercise of rational judgment. 79 The instru-
mental justification focuses not so much on what is necessary for a
person to exist as an individual, but rather upon what people
ought to be allowed to do with their individuality. The instru-
mentalist justification thus rests on the view that absent protection
of certain liberties, some goods will not be available in sufficient
quantity.80
3. The definitional difficulty
One of the difficulties facing freedom of speech theory lies in
79. See infra text accompanying notes 123-133, 212-225.
80. Some would suggest that instrumental concerns should take a subsidiary po-
sition to arguments based on transcendent values such as the speaker's autonomy.
Dworkin apparently adopts a similar position in his discussion of "rights" and
"goals." See R. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 169-72. There are two main reasons
why such a position is untenable.
First, the content we give to transcendent values may always be restated as in-
strumental concerns, and vice versa. (This is equally true for Dworkin's rights and
goals.) The second reason not to ascribe dispositive weight to transcendental values
relative to instrumental concerns is that if the former are given a concrete content and
precedence over the latter concerns in real cases, more harm may be done to transcen-
dental values than if they were not granted a priority status. It only makes sense to
accord dispositive weight to transcendental values if we are certain that our world is
not a moral "second best."
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the circularity of the task. The scope and content of freedom of
speech must ultimately rely upon a description of existing social
practices and legal entitlements. Yet social practices and legal en-
titlements must themselves be scrutinized to determine whether
they are related to, or perhaps interfere with, freedom of speech.
In pursuing these two inquiries, one can ask either why certain
speech should be protected or why it should not. 8' In either case,
categorical theories of the first amendment prove unsatisfactory,
for they fail to account for and indeed submerge the three major
problems of liberal political philosophy.
Categorical definitions of protected speech are plausible only
if there is either a single normative value served by freedom of
speech or if the several normative values served by the first
amendment happen to coincide in terms of the categories they
prescribe. That there is no agreement among the commentators
on one value served by the first amendment is clear.8 2 The values
advanced by the commentators are generally some variation of
the following: the search for truth, self-realization, participation
in peaceful change, and the functioning of the democratic
process. 83
I assume that some variant of the values advanced by the
commentators discussed herein has appeal in some concrete
cases. 84 The Premise of Individualism, however, deprives liberal
political philosophy of any secure vantage point from which to
81. Professor Schauer characterizes these two approaches to the problem of iden-
tifying the scope of protected speech as "defining in" and "defining out." Schauer,
supra note 1, at 279-81. In the commercial speech area, for instance, the "defining
out" method asks "Why shouldn't commercial speech be covered?" Whereas the "de-
fining in" method asks "Why should commercial speech be covered?" Id. at 281.
Noting that in a perfect world the two approaches should produce the same results,
Professor Schauer argues that presumptions and burdens are necessary to ensure that
our ranking of values in terms of importance is reflected in the decisions we make.
Therefore, he argues that placing the burden on someone to explain why speech
should not be protected is a more speech protective inquiry than asking why speech
should be protected. Id. at 280-81.
82. See commentators cited supra note 1.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 123-224. Even minor differences in the
articulation of the values advanced can, of course, have an impact on the scope and
content ascribed to freedom of speech. The more abstract the value, however, the less
clear it is what speech is, or is not, protected. On the other hand, those commentators
who define the first amendment as coextensive with political speech (an arguably less
abstract value) seem more clearly to violate the Premise of Individualism: speech is,
after all, essential to the pursuit of some individual ends and values that are unrelated
to the political arena.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 123-224. As described by Professor Emer-
son, the values underlying freedom of speech are "(1) individual self-fulfillment, (2)
the advance of knowledge and discovery of truth, (3) participation in decisionmaking
by all members of society, and (4) maintenance of the proper balance between stabil-
ity and change." Emerson, supra note 1, at 423.
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decide which normative value should be recognized. Thus, rejec-
tion in the abstract of any of the values advanced is exceedingly
problematic. For the same reason, any ranking of the normative
values is also problematic. A categorical theory embodying a sin-
gle normative value will seem appealing from a normative stand-
point only if it appears to be highly abstract and potentially all
encompassing-in other words, only to the degree to which it fails
to compel any particular result. For that reason, such a theory
will be rejected. On the other hand, a categorical theory which is
appealing because it appears to compel results in concrete cases
will not gain adherence because its normative boundaries will be
too narrow. Finally, the possibility that a categorical theory could
encompass a number of different normative values is not a realis-
tic one: each normative value would compass the realm of pro-
tected speech differently. The very inelegance of a calculus of
categories based on a multiplicity of normative values suggests
that the wrong edifice is being built.
B. The Speech Liberty vs. The Means to Realize the Speech
Liberty
A theory that seeks to draw a line between freedom of speech
and the means to realize freedom of speech in a categorical man-
ner necessarily fails for two reasons. First, speech is multi-faceted;
one cannot apply a formal rule across the board because a given
type or form of speech may be more or less bound up with the
means of its realization.8 5 There is no constant, bright line be-
85. It might appear that the question of whether a burden constitutes an abridg-
ment goes not so much to the issue of what constitutes speech under the first amend-
ment, but rather to the question of how the state may regulate speech which is
protected by the first amendment. In my view, the inquiry into whether a burden is a
prohibition of speech is relevant to both issues-and whether one views it as relevant
to one issue or the other depends on how the question is asked.
For example, Judge Skelly Wright criticized the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), where the Court stated: "[T]his Court has never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money op-
erates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny re-
quired by the First Amendment." Id. at 16. In response, Judge Wright stated:
I am bound to say that this passage performs a judicial sleight of hand.
The real question in the case was: Can the use of money be regulated,
by analogy to conduct such as draft-card burning, where there is an
undoubted incidental effect on speech? However, what the Court asked
was whetherpure speech can be regulated where there is some inciden-
tal effect on money. Naturally the answer to the Court's question was
"No." But this left untouched the real question in the case.
Wright, Political and the Constitution.- Is Money Speech, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1007-08
(1976). Judge Wright's criticism of the Court's approach clearly underscores the point
that the question of whether a burden amounts to a prohibition can be relevant both
to the question of what constitutes protected speech and to the issue of how the state
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tween form and substance in first amendment analysis.86 Rules
which govern time, place, and manner have a definite impact on
what it is that can be said.87 Rules that are said to affect speech
only incidentally also have an effect on what it is that is said. For
example, zoning ordinances bear upon architecture and thus can
curtail certain artistic statements. Similarly, scholarly discussion
of symbolic speech is full of questions about whether individuals
should be able to co-opt certain matters as symbols to communi-
cate for their own ends.88
The second problem is one of determining what impact a
burden is likely to have on the speaker.89 Not all speakers are
situated similarly in terms of access to the resources necessary to
may regulate it: the characterization of the issue depends upon whether the object of
a regulation is described as protected speech or the means to engage in speech.
86. This point is developed by Professor Karst in his analysis of equality as cen-
tral to the first amendment. Karst, supra note 1. Professor Karst argues that the
Supreme Court's recognition of the principles of equality and equal access in first
amendment analysis requires an examination of state prohibition and regulation of
speech to determine whether they have differential impacts on the content of speech.
Id. In some cases, such as Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the
courts can determine the validity of prohibition or regulation fairly easily because the
legislation on its face discriminates on the basis of content. Karst, supra note 1, at 36.
In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds, but by ref-
erence to first amendment analysis, an ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150
feet of a school during school hours except for peaceful labor picketing. /d. at 27.
For a controversial attack on the concept of equality as lacking substantive moral
content and thus deserving of exile from moral and legal discourse, see Westen, The
Empty Idea, supra note 6 1.
87. Professor Karst argues that time, place, and manner restrictions that appear
to be facially content neutral may in fact discriminate on the basis of content (as well
as on the basis of who can speak, see infra note 89). Karst, supra note I, at 39. If the
ordinance in Mosley had been rewritten to exclude the exception for peaceful labor
picketing, a significant discriminatory burden would have been placed on labor pick-
eting as well as all other messages intended to be communicated to the school, the
students, or the faculty. Karst, supra note 1, at 37. It is clear that by regulating the
vehicles of speech (e.g., leafletting), the state may have an impact on the content of
what is said. Equally important, by regulating the fora in which speech may occur,
the state may also have an impact on what is said. Professor Karst argues that if the
state intends to suppress minority views, it could achieve its aims by regulating the
fora in which those views are likely to be aired (e.g., the parks, the streets, etc.). It is
hardly surprising that those with the more controversial and unpopular views are the
least likely to have access to the more privileged arenas of speech. See id. at 40-43.
88. In discussing flag desecration cases, Professor Ely argues that statutes prohib-
iting certain uses of the flag, although content-neutral in terms of the messages that
might be communicated by the prohibited uses of the flag, are facially unconstitu-
tional in that they single out one message (whatever the flag means to the state) for
protection. Ely, supra note 1, at 1502-08.
89. Professor Karst notes this point in his analysis of equality as a central princi-
ple of the first amendment. Karst, supra note 1, at 37. If equality is to play a central
role in first amendment analysis, there is a problem of harmonizing equality of access
by speakers, equality of access to viewpoints, and equality of access by listeners
(based either on their status as listeners or on their status as listeners with certain
viewpoints).
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engage in speech. A relatively minor burden on one class of
speakers may be tantamount to an outright prohibition when ap-
plied to others.90 Despite this disparate impact, a categorical the-
ory must draw a rigid, abstract line dividing the speech liberty
from the means to engage in speech. In drawing such a line, a
categorical approach leaves speakers (and listeners) of lesser
means unprotected from the imposition of government burdens. 9'
The very existence of this rigid line tracking a liberty/means dis-
tinction does more than impact differently on types of speech,
speakers, and listeners. It also issues a clear indication to the state
of permissible methods for suppressing undesirable speech or
speakers and similarly announces to the most well-off speakers
how they might restructure their speech to fall within the protec-
tion afforded by the categories established.
By virtue of the rigidity and high level of abstraction with
which the categories are drawn, categorical theories serve to ob-
scure and insulate these problems. Indeed, categorical theories in
effect replicate the unjustified and arbitrary distinction between
liberty and the means to realize liberty offered by liberal political
philosophy.92
C. The Needfor a Mediating Princiole
The categories established by any categorical theory are, to
some degree, normative: they define protected areas of speech in
terms of underlying justifications (i.e., what speech ought to be
protected). There is no reason to suppose that such normative cat-
egories immediately identify real world forms or that the norma-
tive significance of certain categories necessarily coincides with
their operational significance. 93 For example, while we may call
certain speech items "commercial speech" for purposes of accord-
ing a certain level of protection to such speech, there is no guaran-
90. It is clear that some equality inquiry is appropriate under the first amend-
ment. The reason is simple: sometimes a benefit or burden may be so indirectly
related to speech that we will be unwilling to say whether the first amendment pre-
vents its imposition. The choice will be left to the state, but if the state does impose
the benefit or burden, the way in which it distributes the burden or benefit can have a
significant impact on who can say something, who can hear it, and what it is that can
be said.
91. See Karst, supra note 1, at 36 (formally content-neutral laws might well con-
stitute content discrimination).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 123-224.
93. By "normative" I mean a statement of what speech should or should not be
protected. By "operational" I mean a description of the speech as it occurs in the real
world. If an operational set of speech can be defined, there is no guarantee that a
corresponding normative set of speech (which is neither under- nor over-inclusive)
can be easily defined, and vice versa. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note I, at 269-73; see
also infra note 94.
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tee that the "commercial speech" we are talking about in our
normative theory coincides with what we call "commercial
speech" in the everyday world.94
As categories necessarily have normative origins, some prin-
ciple must be advanced to enable the classification of real world
speech into the taxonomy. Two such principles are utilitarianism
and majoritarianism, but, as we have seen, both are unsatisfac-
tory.95 We might be tempted to base the mediating principle on a
"minimalist perspective." For example, if political speech is pro-
tected, we would like to ask the individual who is claiming a right
of free speech whether, in his language, the speech he claims is
protected would be considered political speech. This approach,
however, does not work. First, inasmuch as the individual has an
interest in his speech, there is good reason to doubt his veracity
when he responds, "Yes, my speech is political. ' 96 Second, when
the individual claims that his speech is political, he may not be
speaking the same language we are, and his reasons for claiming
that the speech is political may have nothing to do with the rea-
sons we protect political speech. Thus, it is not clear that we
should recognize that individual's language as a legitimate basis
for decision.97
94. Suppose that on the basis of a categorical approach we are trying to decide
the issue of whether commercial speech should be protected. There are two possibili-
ties.
If we are "categorizing down," that is, trying to establish categories from identi-
fied fundamental interests in freedom of speech, there is no reason to suppose that the
normative categories correspond to what we identify as commercial speech in our
everyday language.
Sometimes, we "categorize up." That is, we identify a real world category like
commercial speech, abstract certain real world characteristics of such speech, and at-
tempt to determine on the basis of fundamental first amendment values whether com-
mercial speech is protected. This approach is hardly flawless either: in abstracting
certain characteristics of real-world commercial speech, we may have abstracted the
wrong ones. Furthermore, in starting with the real world category of commercial
speech we may have prejudiced the outcome. Perhaps instead of abstracting from
commercial speech, we should have started on a lower level of abstraction (e.g., ad-
vertising, contracts, merchandising, etc.). One commentator seems to suggest as
much. Gerety, Pornography and Violence, 40 U. PiTT. L. REV. 627, 638 n.30 (1979).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
96. As Judge Bork points out, a minority cannot be trusted to define the freedoms
accorded to the majority. Bork, supra note 1, at 3.
97. In the best of all possible worlds, we would try to learn the language of the
individual claiming a political speech interest, make a determination of whether to
adopt his language, and finally decide whether, in his language, the speech which he
claims is protected should be protected for the same reasons that we protect political
speech in our language. When we are not willing to understand a new language, or
when we cannot understand it, we must rely on our own language.
One thing is certain: failure to recognize at some point a common language
brings about a problem of infinite regression. For instance, if our language is consid-
ered too biased by a majoritarian perspective to give us a neutral understanding of the
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Some normative categories may appear to be more closely
related to real world forms than others. For instance,
Meiklejohn's category of "political speech" seems to correspond
more closely to real world forms than Baker's categories of "in-
strumental" and "substantive" speech. 98 The latter do not bear a
close relation to the way we talk about speech in common par-
lance. This point should be relatively obvious even to a reader
who is unfamiliar with the works of Baker and Meiklejohn: such
a reader probably has an idea of what is meant by "political
speech" and probably only a vague idea of what is meant by "sub-
stantively valued" and "instrumentally valued" speech. Never-
theless, our everyday conception of political speech (an
operational category), as will be seen, does not seem accurately to
reflect the normative reasons Meiklejohn advances for protecting
such speech.99 Conversely, while Baker's categories of "instru-
mental" and "substantive" speech are perhaps more faithful to his
normative reasons for protecting or not protecting speech, the cat-
egories bear very little relation to the way in which we typically
view and talk about speech.' 00
The point is that the more operational a category appears, the
greater the likelihood that the operative meaning of the category
bears little relation to the reasons we protect or deny protection to
that category of speech. Similarly, the more faithful a category is
to the underlying reasons we protect or deny protection to that
category of speech, the greater the difficulty we will have in identi-
fying whether certain speech falls within the category. There is no
necessary correspondence between the "is" and the "ought"; the
closer we are to the one, the farther away we are from the other. 10 '
category "political speech," then we perhaps should rely on meta-language. But how
are we to know this meta-language? Perhaps we will find that this meta-language is
also biased by a majoritarian perspective. One can see the infinite regression coming.
See Tribe, supra note 1, at 240-41.
98. Compare A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 94, with Baker, First Amendment
Freedom, supra note 1, at 1017. See infra text accompanying notes 123-188.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 123-128.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 134-145.
101. Scanlon advances a distinction in the methodology of categorization: catego-
ries of interests vs. categories of acts. See Scanlon, Freedom ofExpression, supra note
1, at 537-38. Categories of interests appear to be categories that identify the values
served by a particular type of speech. Categories of acts seem to be categories that
seek to describe the conduct that serves the values identified in the corresponding
categories of interests. Professor Scanlon gives an example of categories of interest
and categories of acts as applied to political speech:
We can distinguish a category of interests in expression that are polit-
ical in this sense, including both participant interest in taking part in the
political process and audience (and bystander) interests in the spread of
information and discussion about political topics. As a category of acts,
on the other hand, "political speech" might be distinguished either by
participant intent-expression with a political purpose---or by content
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One response to these arguments would be that I am raising a
false issue: the problem of tying normative values to real world
forms is a matter of judgment, precisely the task for judges. Be-
cause the task is one of judgment we cannot ask for the articula-
tion of principles to govern its operation. This response is off the
mark. The problem with categorical approaches is that they sup-
plant what should be judgment (relating facts to values) by estab-
lishing categories that aim to compel results. Either a categorical
approach compels results, in which case we would like to know
how, or the categories do not compel results and serve merely as a
facade of justification for decisions reached on some other, un-
known grounds.
The higher the degree of abstraction with which protected
speech is defined, the more we are justified in asking what a judge
would look to in determining whether a given act or social prac-
tice falls within that category of protected speech. Thus, a mediat-
ing principle is needed to permit verification that the judge has
placed the case in the right category. Absent a mediating princi-
ple, the only way we can criticize a judge from within a regime of
and effect-expression that concerns political issues or contributes to
the understanding of political issues.
Id. Professor Scanlon is generally wary of categories of acts, and though he recog-
nizes they may sometimes be necessary, he finds that they are at odds with the first
amendment.
Scanlon's claim can be reduced to the view that categories should be defined at
the normative rather that the operational end of the spectrum. See supra notes 93-94.
The problem with this approach is that it is incomplete, for it leaves undetermined the
criteria one might use to identify when particular instances of real world speech are
embraced by the category. To give an example, Professor Scanlon offers the follow-
ing explanation of the decision in Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978):
The judgment that the Nazi march is protected may reflect the view that
no ordinance giving local authorities the power to ban such a march
could give adequate protection to central interests in political expres-
sion. This argument avoids any judgment as to whether the content
and purposes of this particular march were "genuinely political." It re-
lies instead on the judgment that such a march could not be effectively
and reliably distinguished from political expression that it is essential to
protect.
Scanlon, Freedom of Expression, supra note I, at 539 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). But this account is incomplete. How does one determine that the Nazi
march could not be distinguished from "political expression" requiring protection?
Can one truly avoid the question of whether the content, effect, and source of this
particular march were "genuinely political"? No-but then again from this perspec-
tive, perhaps the case is an easy one: the Nazis look like a "real" political party.
They claimed to be making a political statement. The Skokie community reacted in
political ways. One simply cannot avoid looking at the content of this activity, the
actors, and the listeners to determine whether a distinction can be made between this
given speech act and political expression. The question then is whether judges should
say anything about what principles govern this mental process or simply pretend that
it does not exist.
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categorical decisionmaking is to say that she has placed her case
in the wrong category. But what would inform such a conclusion?
D. A Positive and Negative Suggestion
As previously discussed, the Premise of Individualism leads
to three major problems for liberal political philosophy. 10 2 In
turn, liberal political philosophy and its Premise of Individualism
are the expression of a particular form of social organization, one
where normative and aesthetic values are held to be matters of
individual choice, and where these multiple values have not con-
gealed to coincide neatly with social practices.
Given this view of liberal democratic society, the relationship
between facts and values can be approached in several ways that
will not coincide with each other: the normative value of an activ-
ity may be judged in terms of the activity's content, source, man-
ner, and effect-together, the "parameters." Because of the
fragmentation of value and practice in a liberal democratic society
most of us would be unwilling to relate an abstract normative
value, such as "the search for truth," "peaceful change," "self-re-
alization," or "self government," to activities without allowing
ourselves recourse to at least these four parameters. Recourse to
the four parameters is even more pressing if we admit that all of
these values inform the meaning of the first amendment. To be
sure, the normative evaluation of a particular activity X may ulti-
mately turn upon reference to only one parameter (for instance,
content), but when forced to operate at a higher level of abstrac-
tion-for example, in deciding what types of speech ought to be
protected by the first amendment-recourse to each of the four
parameters appears to be warranted in at least some circum-
stances. Various conceptions of equality likewise require consid-
eration of these four parameters in some circumstances. I will
begin by arguing that the four parameters are relevant and neces-
sary in terms of the positive and negative results we would want in
first amendment cases.10 3
The content of speech is relevant because speech about cer-
tain matters-for example, political speech-may be central to the
102. See supra text accompanying notes 36-76.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84; infra text accompanying notes
104-118. The weaknesses of this approach are manifest. Indeed, I will be addressing
only those readers who are in some sense committed to a liberal democratic perspec-
tive or at least to the concrete results I describe. Nevertheless, I am not so sure that a
radical would not need to resort to these four parameters for an evaluation of a pro-
posed course of action: the fragmentation of practice and value in a liberal demo-
cratic society is sufficiently advanced to render the normative character or
consequence of a particular action largely indeterminate. Reliance on the four pa-
rameters expands the sources of available knowledge.
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democratic process.'04 From the negative perspective, speech
which is not about anything (e.g., the phone book), or speech in
which the speech content is minimal relative to other functions
(e.g., architecture) may deserve less or no protection. It is difficult
to see how one could justify denying protection to speech absent
an examination of its content. 0 5
The manner in which speech affects the world is relevant in-
asmuch as one of the reasons for the protection accorded to
speech, as opposed to other activities, is its generally nonintrusive
character. '0 6 One generally does not have to listen if one does not
104. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 94; BeVier, supra note I at 304-09;
Bork, supra note 1, at 23. But, it has been argued that the democratic process is itself
a means to some greater value: individual self-realization. See Redish, Value of Free
Speech, supra note 1.
105. The theories focusing on content seem to be fairly restrictive of the protection
to be accorded to speech. For example, several theories that accord protection to
political speech would deny protection to speech that advocates forcible overthrow of
the government or violation of law. See Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of
1954." A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 189
(1956); BeVier, supra note I, at 309-10; Bork, supra note 1, at 31. One recent state-
ment of this position based on a content inquiry into the speech is Professor BeVier's:
Because the structure of government established by the Constitution
provides so central a premise for reasoning about the first amendment,
surely consistency demands that first amendment doctrine respect and
seek to maintain the essential integrity of that structure. The constitu-
tional structure itself provides for peaceful change, rendering the advo-
cacy of forcible overthrow quite anomalous. To provide constitutional
protection for such advocacy in principle would represent a failure of
doctrine to respect the essential integrity of the structure it has a duty to
maintain.
BeVier, supra note i, at 310.
In response, it may first be noted that while the structure of government as de-
scribed in the Constitution may provide a useful background from which to analyze
the first amendment, it is hardly a determinative consideration. On the vicissitudes of
attributing content to a particular provision of the Constitution on the basis of a gen-
eral theory of the Constitution, see Schauer, An Essay On Constitutional Language, 29
UCLA L. REV. 797, 814-21 (1982). The structure of government provided in the
Constitution says little about freedom of speech. We therefore have a choice. We can
interpret freedom of speech in terms of the "structure of government" and come up
with a "little" right of free speech, relatively narrow in scope. Or, we can decide that
the structure of government was not intended to say very much about freedom of
speech (since it says so little) and interpret the first amendment in terms other than a
narrow view of our "structure of government."
Second, although there is a conflict between peaceful change and forcible over-
throw of the government, any contradiction between advocacy of forcible overthrow
of the government and peaceful change depends upon a view of causation that attrib-
utes an unrealistic amount of force to speech.
106. There are two variants of this position. One is that speech is generally less
intrusive and therefore it can be granted protection without excessively hindering the
attempts of the majority to govern. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 45-46 (1970). The other is that individuals are bound to have conflicts,
and it is better that these differences be aired in the arena of speech than in other,
more violent ways. This last argument comes close to the "safety valve" theory of the
first amendment. See infra note 199.
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want to. The impact of speech, in contrast to that of other activi-
ties, generally involves the voluntary entry of the spectator into
the arena of activity. From the negative perspective, however,
certain modes of speech may intrude upon others simply because
of the manner in which it produces effects. The pure effect of
some speech may be perfectly lawful and unimpeachable, while
the way in which that speech produces effects may be objectiona-
ble. Blackmail and extortion, for example, seem to fall within this
category. 0 7
The source of speech and its relation to speech are also rele-
vant. Part of the reason for protecting speech stems from our view
of how speech is produced. The relation between thought (in its
broadest sense) and speech seems to compel us to view speech as
the primary medium for the self-realization of the individual. 0 8
From the negative perspective, to the extent that certain speech
does not emanate from an individual but from some artificial in-
stitution, such as a corporation or a government, there may be less
reason to accord constitutional protection. 0 9
The effect of speech is likewise relevant. Indeed, there are
several theories that ground freedom of speech on the effects it has
on individuals or the collective." l0 Some speech, on the other
hand, must be left unprotected or less protected because of its ef-
fects. For example, some speech that invades privacy fits within
this description. I'
107. Some might argue that we prohibit blackmail because of its effects, i.e., that
blackmail has the effect of impermissibly reallocating decision-making authority from
the listener to the speaker. This is a little bit like saying that blackmail has the effect
of being coercive. I think that the type of reallocation of decision-making authority
that occurs in blackmail is coercion and that coercion is different in nature from other
harmful effects. See infra note 11. The difficulty encountered in demonstrating that
blackmail is denied protection because it is coercive underscores the importance of
taking into account both the manner in which speech affects the world as well as the
effects it produces. See infra note 116.
108. Speech is self-definition. See Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1,
at 994-95.
109. On the reasons for according less or no protection to government speech, see
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1104 (1979); Shiffrin, Government Speech, supra note 1; Yudof, "hen Govern-
ments Speak. Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment,
57 TEx. L. REV. 863 (1979).
110. The "safety valve" theory is certainly based on effect considerations. See in-
fra note 199. The marketplace of ideas theory is also an example of a theory focusing
on effects in determining whether certain speech ought to be protected.
111. It would be stretching things to say that we prohibit speech which invades
privacy because it is coercive. Such speech does not coerce anyone to do or abstain
from doing anything; it simply injures. To suggest that every invasion of an individ-
ual's rights is coercive would collapse the semantic distinction between invasion and
coercion. While it may be argued that all coercions are invasions, it is certainly not
true that all invasions are coercions. Invasions can be completed before the victim
becomes aware of the invasion (e.g., theft of property); in this sense, the victim has
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Finally, to the extent that various conceptions of equality
play a central role in first amendment analysis, all parameters are
relevant. Professor Karst demonstrates that equality requires an
examination of the impact of state regulation on the content of
speech." 2 He also demonstrates that an examination of the man-
ner in which speech affects the world is necessary if we are to ob-
serve principles of equality.' '3 The source of speech is also crucial
to equality concerns to the extent that the first amendment pro-
tects speakers as well as viewpoints.' " 4  Finally, the effect of
speech, the fact that speech competes with speech, also bears di-
rectly on equality concerns.' -5
It is difficult to conceive of these four parameters combined
in one coherent, categorical theory.16 There will be cases in
been injured, but he has not been coerced. Coercion involves the assertion of control
over another party concerning the latter's future act or omission.
112. See supra note 86.
113. See supra note 86. See also Karst, supra note 1, at 29-35. This point is most
obvious in cases of time, place, and manner regulations and in cases involving the
question whether the fora of expression are public. See supra note 87; see also Karst,
supra note I, at 35-43.
114. See supra note 87. See also Karst, supra note I, at 39.
115. This point is most transparent in connection with the attempt to regulate the
airwaves. See Karst, supra note 1, at 43-52. The effect of speech on other speech is
also relevant to the regulation of campaign literature. See Shiffrin, Government
Speech, supra note 1, at 595-601. The hesitation to accord full first amendment pro-
tection to advertising derives in part from the fact that such speech can drown out the
speech of those who are not wedded to a capitalist system, and that it reinforces the
values of a materialistic culture as an almost unintended by-product of trying to sell a
good or a service.
116. As the number of concerns which inform a normative theory increases, the
likelihood that one can devise coherent rules that respect all these concerns decreases.
Cf. Schauer, supra note 1, at 276-77. It might be argued that some of these parame-
ters overlap. For example, when we prohibit blackmail because it usurps the victim's
free choice, is this a "manner" argument or an "effect" argument? I submit that it is a
manner argument because the harm we are guarding against is how the speech oper-
ates on the listener, not the effects it produces. But this is a tautology. And that is
part of the point. How we characterize the world before applying our concepts has a
great impact on what our categories tell us to do. The very possibility of conflicting
characterizations should caution us not to build a first amendment theory solely upon
one parameter. Indeed, one can view the prohibition of blackmail as based upon
effect: blackmail has the effect of taking away the listener's freedom of choice, and
that is why it is prohibited. Any theory describing coercive acts can be translated into
a corresponding theory of effects by focusing on the victim of coercion and describing
the effects produced on the victim. Similarly, any theory about the effects of speech
can be translated into a theory about the content of speech: We need only define the
speech as containing its effects.
The point is that all the parameters-content, manner, source, and effect-can be
translated into each other. Yet the four parameters retain meaning even if we cannot
define boundaries.
The four first amendment theories discussed herein smuggle desirable conclu-
sions on the protection of certain speech into their theoretical frameworks even where
it should be clear that the reasons we protect or deny protection to that speech involve
one or more parameters outside of their frameworks. For example, Professor Shiffrin
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which one or more of the parameters are implicated to a greater
extent than the others." 17 Decisions about whether to protect cer-
tain types of speech might require different levels of concern to be
accorded to any of the four parameters." 8 Ultimately, the para-
meters require four separate inquiries into why speech should or
should not be protected. The inquiries should proceed not on an
abstract level, but rather in the context of particular cases. In con-
trast to categorical approaches, these parameters do not seek to
compel conclusions. Rather, the parameters identify areas of in-
quiry that a court might examine in determining whether and how
a given activity is related to the values underlying freedom of
speech.
IV. CRITIQUE OF FOUR CATEGORICAL THEORIES
OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The theories of Meiklejohn, Emerson, Baker, and the Mar-
notes that some of the concrete results reached by Emerson depend upon a concern
for the effects of certain speech. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra note
1, at 959-60. Likewise, the attraction of Baker's argument that commercial speech is
unprotected because such speech is dictated by the market and thus not substantively
valued by the speaker ultimately depends upon an underlying view of the content
of that speech: tripe. See infra text accompanying notes 155-165. Similarly,
Meiklejohn's view that interruptions of lectures, classrooms, concerts, etc. are not pro-
tected by the first amendment must be grounded on a concern for the manner or
effects of such speech. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 36. Finally, adherents
to the marketplace of ideas would have to stretch the definition of the search for truth
quite far to claim that protection of the musical or graphic arts is accorded because of
their effects on that search.
117. With respect to corporate speech, for example, it may be argued that consid-
eration of the source of speech is determinative in concluding that such speech should
not be protected. See Baker, Realizing Self-Realization, supra note 1.
118. Obscenity is one area where arguments for denying protection have been
forcefully (even if not persuasively) cast in terms of each of the four parameters.
source: The concern is about the commercial exploitation of sexual
anxieties. See Karst, supra note 1, at 32.
content: There is nothing there that we might call speech; it is a sex-aid.
Obscenity, or, more precisely, pornography, is no more protected by the
first amendment than escargot. See Schauer, Response, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 40 U. PIrT. L. REV. 605 (1979); contra Baker,
First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 1008; Gerety, supra note 94,
at 648.
manner: Somehow obscenity is more coercive than other speech in that
its mere appearance in the marketplace intrudes on our privacy and
makes a shabby, captive audience of us all, see Bickel, Dissenting and
Concurring Opinions, 22 PUa. INTEREST 25 (1971), or it simply makes
captives of children, see Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Pro-
tect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 345-50 (1966).
effect: Obscenity results in criminal behavior and other anti-social con-
duct. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 451-53 (1966)
(Clark, J., dissenting), and authorities cited therein.
If there are doubts as to whether the reasons to deny protection to obscenity have
been classified correctly in terms of the four parameters, see supra note 116.
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ketplace Theorists are discussed below to show that theories that
do not take into account all four parameters are bound to fail. I
choose these four theories because, while they are all categorical,
the values they advance and the types of categories they establish
are quite different.
Meiklejohn's vision of the first amendment as protecting
political speech" 19 refers to the types of issues that arise in collec-
tive decisionmaking. Thus, Meiklejohn focuses directly on the
content of the speech and the relation of that content to the demo-
cratic process. Emerson's categories of "action" and "expression"
pertain to the manner in which speech affects the world. 120
Speech that affects the world in a coercive manner may be classed
as action and left unprotected. Baker develops a theory that fo-
cuses both on the relation of speech to its source and on the man-
ner in which the speech will affect the world. 121 The Marketplace
Theorists view speech in terms of effect-the consequences of
speech for listeners and for truth. 122 The discussion of these four
theories will show that content, manner, source, and effect are all
relevant criteria in determining what speech should be protected.
The discussion also illuminates the incapacity of categorical ap-
proaches to define freedom of speech adequately, to formulate ra-
tional distinctions between liberty and the means to realize liberty,
as well as to provide a mediating principle.
A. Meiklejohn and Public Speech
Meiklejohn, in what may be called his first interpretation of
the first amendment, argued that "public" speech-speech on
public issues or connected with self-government-should be enti-
tled to first amendment protection, while "private" speech should
be afforded less complete protection. 123 Explaining that in a dem-
ocratic society self-government is an important value and that
political or public speech is essential to self-government, 124
Meiklejohn states: "The guarantee given by the First Amendment
is not, then, assured to all speaking. It is assured only to speech
which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters
have to deal--only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of
public interest."'125 Thus, Meiklejohn's first interpretation of the
119. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13.
120. See T. EMERSON, supra note 106, at 17.
121. See Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 997-1000.
122. See T. EMERSON, supra note 106, at 6; J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1946).
123. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 37-39. Private speech, according to
Meiklejohn, is afforded less complete protection under the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 59.
124. Id. at 88.
125. Id. at 94.
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first amendment, unfortunately, does not extend protection to lit-
erary, scientific, and other forms of speech that contribute to self-
realization. And his definition of public speech, because it is
based upon issues of interest to voters, is itself entirely too narrow:
he advances no reason why only political matters that are on the
voters' agenda should be accorded protection. The voters' agenda
is, after all, subject to change-principally by means of speech.
When commentators criticized Meiklejohn's theory of pro-
tected speech as unduly restrictive and argued that the framers of
the amendment "would hardly have relegated science, art, drama
and poetry to the obscure shelter of the Fifth Amendment,"' 26
Meiklejohn responded by asserting that from such speech the vot-
ers derive "knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values:
the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as pos-
sible, a ballot should express."1 27 This reformulation lacks a de-
fensible stopping point: all speech can potentially heighten a
voter's sensitivity, knowledge, etc.
Meiklejohn's first theory defines freedom of speech too nar-
rowly, thereby raising the problem of how to define liberty. His
reformulation seeks to avoid that problem by including the means
to the liberty defined in his first theory within the realm of pro-
tected speech. The unbounded reformulation underscores the
problems of distinguishing liberty from the means of its realiza-
tion. Meiklejohn's theory protects either too little or too much. 28
Another problem with Meiklejohn's theory is that it does not
articulate a concrete meaning for the term political (or public)
speech. 29 Speech can be political in terms of its consequences. It
can be politically motivated, intended to be political, or intended
to have a political effect. Similarly the delivery of the speech can
be political. Finally, the speaker can be political. These are all
126. Chafee, supra note 13, at 896.
127. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
256.
128. If art and literature are protectable on the theory that they have polit-
ical impact, private speech is protectable afortiori. In short, once the
door is opened, it becomes difficult to close. Either a politically based
theory excludes speech such as literature which virtually everyone (in-
cluding the "founding fathers") agrees is deserving of protection, or, by
making adjustments to include such speech, it makes it impossible to
justify a stopping point.
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra note 1, at 937-38 (footnotes omitted).
129. Meiklejohn justifies the special status of political speech from the listener's
perspective. Meiklejohn, supra note 127, at 255. This hardly restricts the type of
speech which fits into the category of political speech. This justification merely means
that if a piece of speech is deemed not to be political from a listener's perspective,
then the fact that such speech is political from the speaker's perspective will not suf-
fice to warrant protection.
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different meanings of "political speech."' 130 Meiklejohn's theory
thus illustrates one of the central problems of categorical ap-
proaches to the first amendment: he does not provide a mediating
principle to relate real world activities to his abstract conception
of freedom of political speech.
If we attempt to define political speech by reference to cur-
rent social practices (e.g., issues before the voters), some of the
operational difficulties in distinguishing between political and
nonpolitical speech seem to disappear. When applied to give con-
crete meaning to Meiklejohn's category of political speech (and
thus to tie concrete social practices to the liberty interest), such a
definition yields fairly arbitrary and unacceptable results in the
distinction between protected liberty and the (unprotected) means
to realize liberty. By limiting protection to political speech as de-
fined in terms of social practices, we are saying in effect that only
speech concerning issues deemed appropriate for collective deci-
sionmaking (and speech concerning the proper limits of collective
decisionmaking) would be protected. For example, speech argu-
ing against permitting American corporate investment in South
Africa would presumably be considered political speech. Speech
merely describing American corporate holdings in South Africa,
however, would not necessarily be considered political.' 3' Under
the first Meiklejohn view, the state may not suppress the expres-
sion of a political point of view, but the state may suppress some
types of information necessary to develop or support a political
point of view. Under Meiklejohn's revised theory, which protects
philosophy, science, art, and literature because they contribute to
the voter's "capacity for sane and objective judgment," the con-
cept of political speech is depleted of any substance. 32
Meiklejohn thus leaves us in no better position than does
Rawls. 133 We are told to choose political speech as a liberty to be
protected, but we do not know what freedom of political speech
means. Or, if we do know what it means, we are given no reason
to prefer it to some broader definition of freedom of speech.
130. If self-government is the ultimate value, then it is not clear why speaker inter-
ests should not count in the determination of what constitutes political speech.
13 1. If the speech were merely descriptive, and the issue of American investments
in South Africa was not currently one of public concern, the description in the text
would seem to fit into Meiklejohn's definition of "private" speech. Meiklejohn states:
If men are engaged, as we so commonly are, in argument, or inquiry, or
advocacy, or incitement which is directed toward our private interests,
private privileges, private possessions, we are, of course, entitled to
"due process" protection of those activities. But the First Amendment
has no concern over such protection.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 94.
132. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra note 1, at 938.
133. See supra notes 44-74 and accompanying text.
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B. Baker and Substantively Valued Speech
Professor Baker has articulated a constitutional theory
designed to maximize individual opportunities for self-realization
and participation in change-the two values he identifies as fun-
damental to freedom of speech.134 Baker argues that only speech
or conduct that embodies the speaker's "substantive values" (as
opposed to "instrumental values") in a noncoercive manner and
without interference in other persons' substantively valued activi-
ties, is protected by the first amendment.' 35 All other speech or
conduct is subject to collective decisionmaking within the con-
straints of equality notions based on the fourteenth amendment.
Three major distinctions-substantive/instrumental value, gen-
eral prohibition/allocation rule, and determinative/additive activ-
ity-form the core of Baker's first amendment theory.
For Baker, an activity is substantively valued if it is pursued
as an end in itself. Activities are instrumentally valued when they
aid in the attainment of other ends.' 36 The determination of
whether an activity is substantively or instrumentally valued re-
quires us to look at current social practices. 37 Baker's insight is
that reflection upon current social practice will allow us to catego-
rize activities based upon the nature of the act, a basis independ-
ent of whether we want to see the activity subject to prohibition. 38
If this insight is correct, Baker's approach is distinguishable both
from utilitarian reliance on existing preferences and from a
majoritarian approach. 139
Baker argues that substantively valued activities (to the ex-
tent that they do not collide with other substantively valued activi-
ties) enjoy first amendment protection from "general
prohibition."'' 40 A general prohibition is defined as a law that
prohibits anyone from undertaking a specific activity.141 General
prohibitions are to be distinguished from "allocation rules," which
determine who has the right to make a decision concerning an
134. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 991-92.
135. Id. at 1009.
136. Id. at 1016-17.
137. Baker argues that the determination is "culturally relative." Id. at 1017; see
also Baker, supra note 68, at 394 n.44.
138. For example, if Baker's theory is to work, someone who wants to see obscen-
ity banned must nevertheless recognize that obscenity is substantively valued and
therefore not subject. to state prohibition. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra
note 1, at 1008, 1018.
139. Baker's approach would deny the state the ability to prohibit a substantively
valued activity of one util, which 20% of the people want to pursue, in order to allow
the other 80% to engage in an instrumentally valued activity of one util.
140. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 1019.
141. Laws that prohibit deviant sexual conduct or the taking of drugs are general
prohibitions. Id. at 1013-16.
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activity. Allocation rules accord property rights enabling individ-
uals or groups to make decisions. 142 According to Baker, there are
two constraints on the creation of allocation rules: (1) the state
may not give a person the original right to determine what an-
other person must do or say; and (2) the state must respect some
measure of equality when it formulates allocation rules. 143 Baker
then concludes that a general prohibition on an instrumentally
valued activity (or on the instrumental aspect of a substantively
valued activity) operates as an allocation rule. Such a law simply
makes it more difficult for the individual to engage in the substan-
tively valued activity: greater resources are needed or alternative
means must be used. 144
For Baker there is only one circumstance in which it is per-
missible to apply a general prohibition to a substantively valued
activity. When the substantively valued activity of some individu-
als conflicts with the substantively valued activity of others, a col-
lective decision is permissible and, in fact, required. 145 Baker calls
such conflicting activities "determinative"; that is, they determine
the environment in the sense that the actions of some will alter the
environment in a marked way. If knowing the number of people
who engage in the activity is crucial for ascertaining what type of
effect they will have on the environment, Baker would call that
sort of activity "additive." The underlying concept at work in
Baker's distinction is that additive activities contribute to the envi-
ronment, whereas determinative activities determine the
environment.
The following subsections examine two topics: the applica-
tion of Baker's theory to commercial speech, 146 and his rejection
of the view that a listener's interest in speech can serve as a basis
for first amendment protection. 147 As will be seen, the categorical
nature of Baker's theory reflects rather than overcomes the
problems inherent to liberal political philosophy in general.
1. Baker and Commercial Speech
On the basis of his first amendment theory, Baker concludes
that commercial speech is not protected. 48 He argues that market
forces determine the content of commercial speech insofar as the
rational pursuit of profits demands that certain types of speech be
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1014-15.
144. Id. at 1019.
145. Id. at 1019 n.55; see Baker, supra note 68, at 405-10.
146. See Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. i (1976).
147. See id. See also Baker, Realizing Self-Realization, supra note 1.
148. See Baker, supra note 146.
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communicated by the enterprise. 149 Thus, the values of the enter-
prise "speaker" and his views about the world have no bearing on
the speech of the enterprise. 50 Baker does not deny that the indi-
vidual's freely adopted values may coincide with those emitted in
the commercial speech.' 5' Rather, he argues that since commer-
cial speech dictates a certain expression the individual cannot be
said to have chosen the speech. -2 The fact that an individual's
values coincide with the values expressed in the commercial
speech is of no consequence because the speech would have oc-
curred even if the particular individual had not been there.
There is an inherent appeal in Baker's argument: most of us
would concede that the market significantly determines the limits
and content of commercial speech. And indeed, Baker's argument
is based on the assumption that there are ascertainable historical
or socio-economic laws (namely, the market) that determine the
content of speech. There are three problems with this ap-
proach. 53 First, there is no compelling reason to believe that
Baker has adequately identified the domain of social experience
governed by historical laws. In response to Baker, Professor Red-
ish suggests that even if much commercial speech is dictated by
the market, such speech is not dictated down to the last detail; the
remaining realm of choice allows for self-expression of the adver-
tiser's values. 54
Second, Baker may have made a persuasive case for the view
that the market necessarily evokes a specific type of speech with
certain content, but he has not made any argument that individu-
als would not and do not choose freely to engage in that type of
149. The separation (of the profit motivated enterprise from the good-con-
sumption oriented budgetary unit) allows and requires activity within
the economically productive and allocative sphere of life to be increas-
ingly divorced from the individual values of the actors and, instead, to
be instrumentally oriented toward the one structurally required goal-
profits. The economic actors are given no choice but to pursue profits.
Id. at 13. According to Baker, the "good-consumption oriented budgetary unit" re-
fers "to all areas of activity in which choice depends on the substantive values of the
individual and on the satisfaction of one's desires." Id. at 12 n.4 1.
150. The proposition that commercial speech cannot be attributed to indi-
vidual free choice is explained not by the fact that psychological factors
determine or influence the individual's beliefs-some would hold that
this is always the case-but by the fact that the individual's beliefs,
however formed, do not determine the speech.
Id. at 18.
151. Baker admits that "[aln individual's personal values may lead her to make or
sponsor messages with content identical to market-dictated speech." Baker, Realizing
Self-Realization, supra note 1, at 653.
152. See Baker, supra note 146, at 18; Baker, supra note 1, at 996 n.102.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 154-165.
154. Redish, Value of Free Speech, supra note 1, at 621.
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speech.'5 5 In contrast with liberal political philosophy, Baker
abandons "historical agnosticism." Nevertheless, this stance has
problems. On its face, Baker's theory rests on a process argument:
in capitalist societies, there is a causal link between profit max-
imization in a market structure and the content and scope of ad-
vertising. 156 But ultimately, if we accept such a causal link, we do
so because we do not believe that people would express much of
the tripe of commercial advertising unless their speech were dic-
tated by the market.
Such a moral or aesthetic evaluation, however, cannot serve
as support for Baker's theory of causation without running afoul
of the Premise of Individualism and Baker's own views. 157 Yet,
without such a moral or aesthetic evaluation of the content of
commercial speech, Baker's theory of market causation seems
much less convincing. My point is simply that the attraction of
Baker's process argument about the reign of market forces rests
largely on an implicit view of market outcomes: commercial
speech as tripe.
The third problem with Baker's reliance on historical laws as
grounds for denying protection to commercial speech is that there
is no reason to assume that the same historical forces do not gov-
ern other aspects of social life, such as the electoral process' 5 8 and
155. Baker's argument does not (and could not) rely on some view that all human
activity is socially determined. Rather his argument is that certain social forces (the
marketplace and the profit maximization required by the market) determine the scope
and content of commercial speech. Because his argument does not rest on some meta-
physical assumption of determinism, Baker can only convince us that there may be
good reason to suspect that commercial speech is determined by the market. He can-
not convince us, however, that an individual engaged in commercial speech is not
freely choosing what social and economic forces might well require. It may be that
Baker is relying on a metaphysical conception of free choice as follows: whenever
historical forces require somebody to do X, then no one can be said to freely choose to
do X. Such a conception would be counterintuitive. For example, the Army no
doubt requires a given number of inductees, but, for some individuals, the decision to
enlist will be freely chosen even under a draft. See supra text accompanying notes
56-59.
156. See Baker, supra note 146, at 9-14.
157. As will be seen, infra text accompanying notes 161-165, it is not permissible
to determine whether an activity is freely chosen, and thus substantively valued, by
attaching a positive or negative value to the activity. Indeed, Baker would agree with
this point. See Baker, supra note 68, at 405 (explaining that the question of whether
an activity is determinative or additive is different from the question of whether peo-
ple want to see the activity treated as determinative or additive).
158. Redish argues that the electoral process, by virtue of its emphasis on winning
elections, subjects candidates to much the same type of constraint that the market and
profit maximization impose upon commercial speech. See Redish, Value of Free
Speech, supra note 1, at 62 1. Baker defends himself on the grounds that, in contrast
to the marketplace, the structures of the electoral process do not prevent or make
irrelevant the expression of a candidate's values. See Baker, Realizing Seif-Realiza-
lion, supra note 1, at 672-75. Both this characterization of the electoral process and
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other noncommercial activities. 15 9 Baker does not provide us with
criteria to delimit the realm of historical laws relative to the world
of freely chosen self-expression. Absent such criteria, Baker's cat-
egories of "substantively valued" and "instrumentally valued" ac-
tivity confront the dilemma faced by liberal political philosophy
in delineating the scope of historical laws from self-directed activ-
ity. As we saw earlier, this dilemma prevents liberal political phi-
losophers from advancing an acceptable distinction between
liberty and the means to its realization. 160
Baker's solution to the liberty/means dilemma is not satisfac-
tory. He suggests that by reflecting on current social practice, we
can categorize activities as instrumentally or substantively valued,
independently of whether or not we want to see the activity pro-
hibited. 16 1 But experience is not organized so as to allow such
value-neutral categorization of social practices. Moreover, the
value attached to a social practice in large part depends upon the
particular ends and values of the participating individuals.
Even Baker seems to suggest that if an individual claims that
a commercial enterprise's speech is an exercise of her personal
freedom, then regulation of that speech may be impermissible.' 62
Thus, if we declare that all commercial speech as a "social prac-
tice" is not substantively valued, then in effect we will be violating
the Premise of Individualism and assuming a type of knowledge
that is antithetical to the fragmentation of value and practice in
liberal society. 163 On the other hand, we cannot permit judges in
first amendment cases to undertake an analysis of whether a par-
the assertion of a significant contrast between the marketplace and the electoral pro-
cess may be doubted.
159. If the profit maximization principle exerts such a sufficiently constraining
force that all commercial speech is market determined, is it not reasonable to suppose
that the same principle might well exert constraining force on the speech and other
behavior of an enterprise's employees in their lives outside the enterprise? For exam-
ple, we can imagine that an enterprise, in accordance with the profit maximization
principle, would constrain its employees to dress and talk in a certain way, join cer-
tain clubs, etc. in life outside the office. Once the profit maximization principle is
admitted as a constraining force, it may be difficult to determine how far its influence
extends. As Baker himself notes, it may well be that the "enterprise" (the realm of
market-determined speech) and the "household" (the realm of freely chosen substan-
tively-valued activity) cannot be easily distinguished in real life. See Baker, Supra
note 146, at 14 n.52.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 44-61.
161. See supra notes 137-139, 157 and accompanying text.
162. See Baker, Realizing Se/f-Realization, supra note 1, at 654.
163. The problem for Baker's theory becomes more intense the more evenly di-
vided the population is on the question of whether a social practice is instrumentally
or substantively valued. Indeed, it does not seem wholly unreasonable to suggest that
some commercial advertising, for example, by members of a legal or abortion clinic,
is substantively valued speech.
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ticular speaker substantively values her speech. 64 The point is
simply that the Premise of Individualism and its corresponding
forms of social organization do not permit categorization of a
given social practice as instrumentally or substantively valued.' 65
2. Baker and Listeners' Rights
Baker asserts that the first amendment protects only the
speaker's self-realization, not the listener's. 166 Baker indicates that
the right of the listener is derivative: the government must not
interfere with the speaker's liberty. "Any other interpretation of
the listener's right could conflict with the speaker's liberty and
would improperly require the government to make more informa-
tion or different opinions available to the listener."'' 67
There are several objections to this argument. First, the mere
interference of a listener's right with a speaker's right arguably is
not a relevant concern since the issue to be decided is the relative
status of listeners' and speakers' rights. The substantive values of
both the speaker and the listener may be implicated by a given
type of speech. There is no a priori ground for favoring one over
the other. Moreover, it is not clear why a listener's right would
"interfere" in all cases with a speaker's right. Contrary to Baker's
164. At times, Baker does seem to suggest that in classifying activities as substan-
tively or instrumentally valued, we should look at the particular individual engaging
in the activity rather than making a determination at the higher level of abstraction of
social practice. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. It is doubtful that Baker
means to advocate such an approach: it is not clear what sort of evidence a court
could rely on to determine whether individual A values activity X substantively or
instrumentally. Such an approach must fail for it would be predicated upon an im-
possible investigation of an individual's value framework.
165. Baker argues that reliance on social practice to determine whether an activity
is substantively valued is a "culturally relative" determination. See Baker, First
Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 1017; see also Baker, supra note 68, at 394 n.44.
While this is no doubt true, our culture is hardly so homogeneous that it can be said
to inform the determination of whether the activity is instrumentally or substantively
valued. And what if our culture were almost completely homogeneous? Would the
first amendment then contract and deny protection to the few aberrant individuals
who substantively valued "deviant" conduct? I doubt that we would want to answer
the question of whether the first amendment should contract in such circumstances,
absent an examination of that hypothetical homogeneous culture.
A significant aspect of Baker's theory is that he would rely either on the culture
or on social practices to determine what liberties should be recognized in the first
instance. The content of liberty is to be defined by reference to activities that are
substantively valued and non-coercive, and identification of these activities is also
supposed to be determined by reference to the culture or social practice. Reference to
culture in examining whether social practices are substantively valued, however, ef-
fectively surrenders any critical principle for the determination. Thus, the mediating
principle of reflecting on social practice or culture not only fails to relate the protected
realm of liberty to real world forms, but also fails to define the content of liberty.
166. Baker, supra note 146, at 8.
167. Id. at 8.
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assertion, favoring or subsidizing certain types of speech for the
benefit of the listener merely increases the burdens that a speaker
must face in competing for scarce speech resources; or it may
merely reduce the value of the speaker's speech by diluting his
speech in a greater pool of speech. The burden thereby placed on
the speaker is, in Baker's own language, an "allocation rule"
rather than a "general prohibition." 68 According to Baker, how-
ever, the only rights that speakers have with regard to allocation
rules is that enough speech resources be distributed to everyone in
order to satisfy the minimal requirements of treatment as equals
under the fourteenth amendment. 169 Thus, favoring or subsi-
dizing speech to enhance listeners' rights should not, within
Baker's framework, be an impermissible dilution of speakers'
rights. Yet Baker claims that it is. 170
Baker's second argument-that recognition of a general lis-
tener's right "would improperly require the government to make
more information of different opinions available to the lis-
tener"l 7 1 -is also flawed. Baker's argument here must be that if
we grant listeners rights, then it necessarily follows, on the basis of
equality concerns, that listeners who want speech for which there
is no willing speaker can properly ask the government to supply
such speech. The failure of the government to supply such speech
to desirous listeners would in effect result in an impermissible con-
tent discrimination with regard to listeners based on the extrane-
ous consideration of whether a speaker is available.
Professor Baker's argument thus formulated depends on the
controversial assumption that if listeners have a right to speech,
the government is under an affirmative obligation to structure the
allocation of resources so that speech will be provided. 72 It is
difficult to understand the basis for this assumption. 173 Certainly,
168. See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
169. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 1015.
170. Id. at 1006-07.
171. Baker, supra note 146, at 8.
172. Professor Shiffrin suggests that there is no reason to suppose that the govern-
ment is under an obligation to subsidize all speech desired by listeners. Shiffrin, Gov-
ernment Speech, supra note 1, at 584 ("The message of the public forum cases is that
some significant opportunities [for speech] must be made available for access on a
basis other than content selection.") (emphasis added). The government might have
an obligation not to interfere with the speaker's speech whenever the listener wants to
hear it, regardless of whether the speaker values his speech substantively or instru-
mentally. Emerson sees evil in government subsidy of speech and does not see why
the government would have to subsidize speech for desirous listeners in the first place.
Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 737, 751 (1977).
173. Part of the grounds for this assumption rests on Baker's insistence that indi-
viduals have a right to engage in non-coercive, substantively valued activities. One
can ask whether listeners' self-realization interests are also entitled to this protection.
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in the area of speakers' rights, Baker argues that the state need
provide only a minimal level of speech resources to individuals on
the basis of equality concerns.' 74 The state is not obligated to give
each speaker the same resources with which to speak. It seems
that the same principle would apply in the area of listeners' rights:
the government cannot prevent speech that listeners want to hear,
but the state does not have to make all speech equally available to
all listeners. Just as a speaker may be forced to pay for his audi-
ence, so may a listener be forced to pay to find his speaker. In
Baker's framework, the relevant concern in both cases should be
equal protection, not the first amendment. 75
In a recent article, 176 Baker offers additional reasons for re-
fusing to recognize a listener's interest in the determination of
whether a given activity ought to be accorded first amendment
protection. First, he rejects the claim that the primordial value of
self-realization requires an unimpeded flow of information. 177
While Baker is no doubt correct in suggesting that we do attain
some degree of self-realization without full information, he has
not shown that self-realization would not be impaired if the free
flow of information were restricted more rather than less. 178
Baker's answer is no, see supra text accompanying note 167, because if they were, then
almost anything that a listener could want to read, view, or hear would be eligible for
protection.
At one point, however, Baker seems to acknowledge that pornography is pro-
tected because of the interest of the reader. See Baker, First Amendment Freedom,
supra note 1, at 1008. Baker also protects obscenity by reference to the press clause.
Id. at 1008 n.122. The press clause, however, does not appear to protect all obscenity
that Baker seeks to protect; therefore, his ultimate justification rests on a liberty inter-
est in the listener. Baker argues elsewhere, however, that the only right of a listener is
to be free to hear speech which is protected because of the speaker's interest. See
supra text accompanying note 167, see also Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra
note 1, at 1006-07. Significantly, Baker provides no criteria to distinguish speakers
from listeners, and it is perhaps because of this absence that Baker ends up protecting
obscenity by reference to the reader. The absence of criteria to distinguish listeners
from speakers is highly problematic because to the extent that what we consider to be
a listener's interest in self-realization can be characterized as a speaker's interest, pro-
tection would have to be accorded to much of the world: an individual might sub-
stantively value a redwood tree, a mountain range, etc. If Baker were to rest a
distinction between speakers and listeners on the grounds that the former is engaged
in active self-realization, while the latter is engaged in passive self-realization, Baker
would then have to explain why active self-realization holds a preferred position in
first amendment freedom of speech. This is difficult enough by itself, but the task
would be complicated by the fact that Baker denies the validity of the passive/active
distinction in the free exercise of religion cases. Id. at 1037.
174. Id. at 1014-15.
175. Id. at 1015.
176. Baker, Realizing Se/f-Realization, supra note 1.
177. Id. at 661.
178. See Redish, Democracy and Freedom, supra note 1, at 683.
Baker fails to show, moreover, why a listener cannot substantively value the re-
ceipt of information. Certainly, it seems clear that I can substantively value the per-
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Baker nevertheless argues that, even recognizing the listener's in-
terest in self-realization, it is difficult to distinguish the contribu-
tion that speech might make to self-realization from the
contribution that other goods, such as education, housing, or shel-
ter, might make to a listener's self-realization. 179 And, since we
cannot recognize a liberty interest in a good education or in food
under the first amendment, so the argument goes, we must dismiss
a listener's interest as a basis for defining liberty. In effect, Baker
suggests simply that if we recognize a listener's interest as the basis
for defining the scope and content of the first amendment, we will
have serious problems distinguishing liberty from the means of its
realization. Significantly, Baker does not recognize that the same
problem of distinguishing liberty from the means of its realization
might well be present when we focus on the speaker; the depriva-
tion of food or education seems to be as much a restraint on
speaking as it is on listening. 80
Baker treats the receipt of information and the listener's in-
terest in speech as if they were only instrumental interests, simply
means to self-realization. He does not address the real possibility
that a listener may substantively value the receipt of speech or the
process by which the speech is received. Because he does not re-
strict the scope of the first amendment protection to speech per se,
but extends protection to other noncoercive, substantively valued
activities, Baker is precluded from recognizing a listener's per-
spective as a basis for defining the contours of freedom of speech.
formance of a piano concerto. Baker would respond that this speech is protected
anyway by reliance on the pianist's interest in self-realization and self-expression.
True, but such reliance would be misplaced when the issue to be decided is precisely
whether we should recognize a listener's interest in speech that would broaden the
scope of the first amendment liberty beyond the speaker's interest.
179. See Baker, Realizing Sef-Realizalion, supra note 1, at 662.
180. Baker's argument lacks symmetry for the simple reason that he does not rec-
ognize that a listener might well substantively value her listening activity. See infra
text accompanying notes 181-188. Once we recognize that both speaking and listen-
ing can be substantively valued activities, it becomes apparent that the question of
whether food deprivation is a restraint on liberty or simply the denial of the means to
realize liberty is problematic in both speaking and listening.
It is important to note that Baker's standards in characterizing activities differ
depending upon whether he is analyzing speakers' or listeners' interests. Baker says
that it will be difficult to define freedom of speech in an acceptable manner if we focus
on the listener's interest because the receipt of food, shelter, and health care are indis-
tinguishable from the receipt of information as far as the value of self-realization is
concerned. Baker, Realizing Self-Realization, supra note I, at 662. This type of argu-
ment can be countered by suggesting that his focus on the speaker will yield an
equally unacceptable definition of freedom of speech: it might be argued that Baker's
theory is unacceptable because eating, living in a house, and caring for one's body are
no less important to the value of self-realization than engaging in political speech. In
other words, whether we are talking about a listener or a speaker depends on how we
characterize an activity (is it receipt of food or is it eating?). See supra note 173.
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Recognizing that listeners can substantively value receiving infor-
mation, perceptions, or sensations might well result in granting
first amendment protection to activities that cannot even remotely
be considered speech. Yet, Baker gives us no justification for dis-
regarding the listener's interest in an activity. Neither has he pro-
vided a workable normative distinction between the active self-
realization of the speaker and the passive self-realization of the
listener when both are engaged in substantively valued activity. 181
3. General Criticism of Baker's Theory
Baker's three categorical distinctions-substan-
tively/ instrumentally valued activity, determinative/additive ac-
tivity, general prohibition/allocation rule-present common
problems. The determination of how any given activity relates to
these three distinctions depends greatly on how the activity is
defined.
If I take the Queen Elizabeth to Europe, am I on a cruise (a
substantively valued activity), or am I merely using a means to
cross the ocean (an instumentally valued activity)? Most likely I,
as well as my fellow passengers, value the activity both instrumen-
tally and substantively. 182 But is the activity to be classified as the
social practice of taking a cruise or as the social practice of trans-
portation? There is absolutely no guidance in Baker's theory as to
how or at what level of abstraction we are to define activities; thus,
the categories of instrumentally and substantively valued activities
can be applied to reach almost any conclusion with regard to any
type of activity. 83 Moreover, an instrumentally valued activity
(e.g., air transport) may be so essential to some substantively val-
ued activity (e.g., international travel) that suppression of the
means may effectively preclude the end.184 Baker would respond
that in such a case, the state may not suppress, but may regulate,
181. See supra note 173.
182. It is indeed likely that most activities are valued both instrumentally and sub-
stantively. It is only when we identify an activity in terms of language that we can
determine whether an activity is valued substantively or instrumentally, and even
then we may disagree. The determination we make after having described the activ-
ity in language reflects more about the language in general and the words we have
chosen in particular (or our values) than it does about the activity itself.
183. This presents two distinct problems. First, the categories can be manipulated
to reach results consistent with judge's values. (Judicial justification is undermined.)
Second, it is not clear that the categories present any basis for categorization other
than the judge's values. (Judicial discovery is undermined.)
184. Baker proposes to treat this type of problem under the equal protection
clause. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 1014-15 (The state must
guarantee some minimum level of opportunity in "making allocations that promote
private parties' opportunity or ability to express themselves.").
1983]
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the means. 185 But again, the relation of means to ends is largely
determined by how one defines the activities.
The same problems emerge for Baker's addi-
tive/determinative and general prohibition/allocation rule dis-
tinctions. 186 The former distinction is made on the basis of
whether the activity contributes to or determines the "environ-
ment." Thus, application of this distinction will turn not only
upon how and at what level of abstraction one defines the activity,
but also how one defines the "environment."'' 87 The problem with
the distinction between general prohibitions and allocation rules is
that an allocation rule may well make it prohibitively expensive
for some persons to engage in a substantively valued activity. 188
How many persons must be affected in this manner before the
allocation rule is treated as a general prohibition?
These definitional problems stem in large part from the fact
that Baker's theory seeks to import into liberal democratic society
a knowledge of social practices, an effort that is hostile to the basic
premises of liberal political philosophy. To claim that social prac-
tices can be described as either instrumentally or substantively
valued would be to suggest that there is widespread agreement
among individuals as to what ends or values they want to pursue.
To assume such agreement, however, violates the Premise of Indi-
vidualism and the corresponding fragmentation of value and
practice in liberal society.
The problem with Baker's approach is that it rests on a body
of knowledge antithetical to liberal political philosophy. Specifi-
cally, his approach rests on the view that current forms of social
organization severely restrict the arena where individuals are free
185. Baker, supra note 68, at 395-96 n.48.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 140-144.
187. Baker is aware of this problem:
One person doing any X, for example, wearing long hair, could be
viewed as determinative; the person's act means the environment is one
where that person wears long hair. Killing the last condor existing in
the world (or in the state, or in the tree), which I suggest is determina-
tive, could be viewed as additive-as being no different than killing one
sparrow-from the perspective that now the world contains slightly less
animal life.
See Baker, supra note 68, at 405. This response intends that current social norms
inform the proper definition of the term environment in all cases. Social norms are
not readily amenable to the task, however, in the cases of condors and long hair, and
much less so in the cases of homosexuality or obscenity, both of which Baker consid-
ers to be additive. Id. at 405-06.
188. Baker recognizes that the state could tax or regulate a substantively valued
activity in such a manner that, without ever prohibiting that activity, the likelihood
that anyone engages in that activity approaches zero. Baker concludes that in such a
case, the state regulation ought to be treated in the same manner as a general prohibi-
tion. Id. at 397 n.51.
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to pursue their own ends and values. Accordingly, the categories
established by Baker make sense only if we also adopt the knowl-
edge that he would bring to bear upon these categories. The cate-
gories themselves permit but do not require us to look to this body
of knowledge in deciding cases. On the other hand, liberal polit-
ical philosophy and the corresponding fragmentation of value and
practice in a liberal democratic society would seem to require re-
jection of this body of knowledge as a basis for developing legal
categories. Because ends and means may be more or less tied to-
gether in particular cases, the distinction should not be accorded
an abstract constitutional significance in determining the scope
and content of the first amendment.
C. Emerson.- The Action-Expression Dichotomy
Professor Emerson identifies four fundamental values that
underlie the system of freedom of expression in a democratic soci-
ety: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) advancement of knowledge
and discovery of truth; (3) participation in decision making by all
members of society; and (4) achievement of a more adaptable and
therefore more stable community.189 He draws two basic implica-
tions from these values. The first is that freedom of expression
itself is an essential end of society: "It is not a general measure of
the individual's right to freedom of expression that any particular
exercise of that right may be thought to promote or retard other
goals of society."' 90 The second is that there is "a fundamental
distinction between belief, opinion, and communication of ideas
on the one hand, and different forms of conduct on the other."' 19
Thus, according to Emerson, "'[action' can be controlled, subject
to other constitutional commands, but not by controlling
expression." 192
Emerson's theory reflects the values that underlie the first
amendment by means of a distinction between expression and ac-
tion-a categorization that "must be guided by consideration of
whether the conduct partakes of the essential qualities of expres-
sion or action, that is, whether expression or action is the domi-
nant element." 193 Emerson's focus thus is on the manner in which
an activity affects the world. Emerson's categories of action and
expression have been criticized because the distinction "operates
189. T. EMERSON, supra note 70, at 6-7.
190. Id. at 8.
191. Id. "[E]xpression must be protected against governmental curtailment at all
points, even where the results of expression may appear to be in conflict with other
social interests that the government is charged with safeguarding." Id. at 17.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 18. See also infra text accompanying notes 195-204.
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less to divide the world of behavior than to indicate the perspec-
tive of the person doing the dividing."'' 94
Indeed, other commentators have argued that since most ac-
tivities that may be protectea under the first amendment involve
action as well as expression, it is pointless to define the scope of
protection in terms of these two categories. 95 Emerson responds
to these criticisms by suggesting that the action/expression distinc-
tion is not intended to be construed literally. 96 Ultimately, the
distinction is to be drawn on the basis of a number of considera-
tions which suggest the relevance of parameters other than
manner:
(1) Whether the conduct is intended to communicate in-
formation, ideas, or emotions.
(2) Whether the conduct promotes the set of values under-
lying the system of freedom of expression.
(3) The nature of the impact of the conduct upon other
persons, particularly whether the impact is essentially mental
rather than physical, noncoercive rather than violent, and of a
character which it is reasonable to ask a democratic society
seeking orderly change to endure.
(4) Whether, although the conduct may not in itself qual-
ify for special protection, such protection is necessary in order
to safeguard other, qualified conduct.
(5) Other factors that may be discovered or articulated as
the concept develops. 197
The first consideration goes to the heart of the ac-
tion/expression distinction, except that it seems to limit expression
to communications and appears to exclude from protection activi-
ties which are not intended to communicate, but are merely self-
defining.
Whatever activities are read out of the scope of protection in
the first consideration are read back in by the second considera-
tion. Expression that is not intended to communicate anything
may clearly promote the four values identified by Emerson as un-
derlying the first amendment.
The third consideration requires an assessment of the nature
of the impact of the activity on other persons. It is interesting that
Emerson speaks of coercion in terms of impact rather than in
terms of the activity. While inquiries into impact are relevant to
judge the effects of an activity, they seem less relevant to deter-
194. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note I, at 1010.
195. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 599; Bork, supra note 1, at 25-28; Ely, supra
note 1, at 1494-95.
196. Emerson, supra note 1, at 478.
197. Id. at 478-79.
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mine the coerciveness of an activity. 98 Emerson's recommended
inquiry into whether the impact of the activity is mental rather
than physical underscores one of the important reasons for grant-
ing a preferred position to speech-namely, speech is less intru-
sive than other human activities because to have an effect it
generally depends upon the listener's acceptance. 199 Yet the dis-
tinction between mental and physical impacts is not wholly ade-
quate even in terms of Emerson's own values. Some speech, for
example, defamation and invasion of privacy, produce mental im-
pacts that are just as serious as physical intrusions.200
The inquiry into whether the speech is of a character that is
reasonable to ask a democratic society seeking orderly change to
endure is hopelessly vague. Presumably, this inquiry could not be
used as a ground for denying protection to speech because, if it
were used, the standard might very well allow suppression of
speech that even the clear and present danger doctrine would not
permit to be suppressed. 20'
The fourth consideration demands an examination of
whether the protection of speech requires the protection of activi-
ties that do not qualify for protection apart from their connection
to speech. This inquiry focuses on one of the fundamental
problems outlined in this Article: distinguishing liberty from the
means of its realization.
The fifth consideration simply allows for the development of
new factors that might be added as refinements to the ac-
tion/expression dichotomy. It seems, however, that if the ac-
tion/expression dichotomy is to retain its meaning and force, its
198. If the notion of impact can be relevant to the question of whether an activity
is coercive or not, it becomes difficult to distinguish the concept of coercion from the
concept of effects.
199. See Wellington, supra note 1, at 1106-07. Generally, speech accords to the
listener some choice in deciding to expose himself to the arena of activity, and, gener-
ally, speech does not produce effects unless the listener is willing to make his intellec-
tual or emotive capacities receptive to the speech. It is ironic that one of the reasons
for the preferred position of speech may be that, as a vehicle for producing intended
results, it is less effective than most. See R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, A
CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 109-11 (1965). This feature of speech in essence un-
derlies the "safety valve theory" of the first amendment. See Karst, supra note 1, at
23 n. 18. As a first amendment theory, the "safety valve" view is, of course, a highly
cynical form of content discrimination: the state accords precisely those speech rights
which shall deprive minorities and unpopular viewpoints from gaining acceptance.
200. Some physical impacts of speech, on the other hand, should clearly be pro-
tected. For example, political demonstrations are often perceived, and perhaps in-
tended, to convey an impression of physical force. Indeed, the very point of staging a
political demonstration as opposed to conventional speech is often to convey, by
means of a "physical" message, the intensity and pervasiveness of a particular opin-
ion or point of view.
201. It seems possible to argue that a democratic society should not be obligated to
endure the speech at issue in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S 444, 447 (1969).
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categorical stature should be abandoned, and the necessity of rely-
ing on parameters other than manner should be recognized.20 2 In-
deed, prior to Emerson's recent elaboration of his theory,
Professor Shiffrin noted that Emerson's denial of first amendment
protection in some concrete situations (for instance, some solicita-
tion to criminal action and some invasions of privacy) indicates
that Emerson at times focuses on the effect of the activity rather
than his categories of action/expression. 20 3
In responding that the distinction between action and expres-
sion is not as difficult to apply as critics contend, Emerson suggests
that in the spectrum extending from action to expression, most
conduct falls close to one pole or the other.2°4 Even if human
activity can be classified so as to concentrate around the poles of
the spectrum, a legislature bent on suppressing speech would, no
doubt, adopt a more ambivalent classification scheme in prohibit-
ing or regulating activities.
Despite the shortcomings of Emerson's action/expression di-
chotomy, 20 5 his focus on the manner in which an activity affects
the world is an important insight. While activities such as threats
of assassination, extortion, or blackmail may convey powerful and
even important messages, there is a strong sense in which the coer-
civeness of such conduct requires its exclusion from first amend-
ment protection. Baker attempts to elaborate on Emerson's
approach by arguing that what underlies the action/expression di-
chotomy is the concept of coercion. 20 6 When conduct operates co-
ercively, it should not be protected (for Emerson, it would amount
to action), but when it does not operate coercively, it should be
protected (for Emerson, it is then expression).20 7
It seems difficult, however, to base a first amendment theory
solely on the concept of coercion. For coercion to be a useful ana-
lytical concept, some notion of entitlement must be developed. If
conduct interferes in a certain way with a rightful entitlement, it
202. See supra text accompanying notes 119-122.
203. See Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra note I, at 959-60.
204. Emerson, supra note 1, at 479. Professor Tribe notes, however, that "expres-
sive behavior is '100% action and 100% expression.'" L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at
599-600 (citing Ely, supra note 1, at 1495-96).
205. For an argument that Emerson's approach is based on balancing, see Shiffrin,
Defamatory Non-Media Speech, supra note 1, at 959-60. BeVier, who classifies Emer-
son as a "definitional balancer," BeVier, supra note 1, at 300 n.4, makes the same
point as Shiffrin. Id. at 319.
206. Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note i, at 1012.
207. For Baker, the fact that certain speech is not coercive does not necessarily
entitle the speech to be protected: protection also hinges on the issue of whether the
speech is substantively valued. Emerson appears to find Baker's approach consistent
with Emerson's identification of self-realization as a fundamental value underlying
the first amendment. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 474.
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then operates coercively. 208 Baker argues that coercive acts typi-
cally violate the ethical principle that in social interaction one
must respect the other's autonomy and integrity as a person, that
one must not disregard that person's will or the integrity of the
person's mental processes. 20 9 The application of the coercion
principle hinges upon what we define as disregarding a person's
will or the integrity of a person's mental processes. 210 We must
first determine what a person is entitled to have or to do before we
can determine whether interference with that person is coercive or
not. The first amendment itself requires that we determine the
entitlements of persons (i.e., victims) from the perspective that
persons shall not have entitlements that are inconsistent with free-
dom of speech. That is, after all, what the first amendment is all
208. Baker recognizes that it is impossible to define coercion absent a notion of
entitlement: By defining and then forbidding invasions of a person's realm of deci-
sion-making authority, allocation rules provide the necessary context in which an act
can be coercive; indeed allocation rules are required by the grammar of coercion.
Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 1020.
209. Id. at 1001.
210. Two illustrations make this point. First, Baker argues that when Jane says to
Dick, "I will tell the public what you did (or are about to do) unless you give me
$1,000," the conduct is coercive. What Jane wants is unrelated to the facts that she
might expose and is an attempt to transfer decision making control to herself. Baker
then argues that when Lisa says to David, "I will tell the public (or the police) if you
proceed," the conduct is not coercive because Lisa's concern is with David's act, and,
therefore, Lisa is not trying to prevent David from making his own decision but is
merely forcing him to take responsibility for his act, an imposition that respects rather
than subverts David's integrity and autonomy. Id. at 1002-03.
Although these illustrations may be appealing, the concept of coercion as the
guiding principle becomes blurred if we inject other values into the determination.
For example, if we assume that privacy is important to integrity and autonomy, does
a threat to disclose intimate private facts fit more appropriately in the first or second
illustration? In one sense, such a threat is aimed at holding a person responsible for
his acts. But in another sense, such a threat is aimed at transferring decision-making
control to the person making the threat because, by definition, what someone is enti-
tled to do in private should be no one else's business.
As a further illustration, how should we categorize a threat to expose personal
facts if a person decides to run for political office? Such a case could fit within
Baker's first illustration. The objective, to deter the individual from running for of-
fice, is unrelated to the facts being disclosed, and the threat is apparently an attempt
to transfer decision-making authority to the person making the threat. But, it may be
argued that any such facts, and certainly at least some (e.g., the person is an alco-
holic), are relevant to voters. If we accept this conclusion, the act could be re-charac-
terized as noncoercive based on the argument that, when someone decides to run for
political office he is accountable for all his past actions. Thus, the threat shows re-
spect for the person being threatened because it requires him to assume responsibility
for his past actions in presently running for office. There is thus some doubt about
whether the threat is coercive.
Defining an act as coercive, therefore, more accurately reflects the values of the
person doing the defining than whether the act in some objective sense is coercive. In
other words, it reflects the definer's underlying belief concerning what the speaker is
entitled to do.
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about: invalidating laws (and other state action) which would be-
stow entitlements inconsistent with freedom of speech. Thus, any
attempt to ground freedom of speech solely by reference to coer-
cion is impossible.21l The circularity of attempting to define the
scope and content of freedom of speech was mentioned earlier.
The attempt to articulate the substance of freedom of speech by
sole reference to the concept of coercion is perhaps an example of
this circularity. It is possible that reference to all four parameters
does not escape the essential circularity of the task. Nevertheless,
reference to the four parameters might serve to expand the possi-
ble sources of knowledge we might gain about freedom of speech.
D. The Marketplace of Ideas and the Search for Truth
The classical justification for the marketplace of ideas theory
is "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which [people's] wishes can safely be car-
ried out."' 212 The marketplace interpretation of the first amend-
ment thus converts freedom of speech into an instrumental good:
freedom of speech is apparently preserved and protected to the
extent that it promotes truth. As such, the theory focuses on the
effect of speech-its impact on the quest for truth.
The marketplace of ideas theory is based on the view that
government should not interfere with robust debate or the free
flow of information because competition among ideas advances
knowledge and leads to better decisions.213 The theory is elo-
quently defended by its exponents in constitutional history as well
as in current philosophical and political analysis.214 In large part,
the attraction for the marketplace of ideas concept stems from its
close relation to the Premise of Individualism: individuals can
211. Id. at 1020.
212. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, J.J.,
dissenting).
213. See Emerson, supra note 172, at 740-41. Here, the "political speech" theo-
rists part company with the marketplace metaphor and argue that freedom of political
speech must be allowed even if it does not lead to truth. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975). As BeVier phrases it, "the amendment protects
the process of forming and expressing the will of the majority according to which our
representatives must govern." BeVier, supra note I, at 309. And, according to Judge
Bork, some speech that might seem outwardly political may be denied protection be-
cause it violates, not the Truth, but certain truths embodied in our form of govern-
ment. Bork, supra note 1, at 31.
214. See generally Emerson, supra note 172, at 741-45. Redish attempts to resur-
rect the marketplace of ideas concept by grounding it on the value of self-realization.
According to Redish, the self-realization value demands a marketplace of ideas be-
cause "the individual needs an uninhibited flow of information and opinion to aid
him or her in making life-affecting decisions, in governing his or her own life." Red-
ish, Value of Free Speech, supra note 1, at 618.
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only choose their ends and values if they are exposed to the
broadest possible set of information, knowledge, and ideas. Nev-
ertheless, the logic underlying the marketplace of ideas has been
crumbling in the face of powerful attack.215 The concept of a
marketplace of ideas presupposes an understanding of what is
meant by "truth" as well as a description of how a free market of
ideas can facilitate discovery of that truth.
Some have argued that truth is not objective, but rather sub-
jective, that is, dependent upon the personality, values, and past
history of a particular individual. 216 The Premise of Individual-
ism would seem to require this proposition. Otherwise, if truth
were objective, there would be no reason to allow individuals to
err by permitting them to choose their own ends and values. Con-
sistent with the Premise of Individualism, the marketplace of ideas
theory must reject the notion of objective truth.217
215. See R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LiBERALiSM 3-50 (1968); Baker, First
Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 974-90.
216. People's knowledge depends upon how they "slice and categorize an ex-
panding mass of sense data." Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note I, at 974.
Human values "which guide the development of perceptions, appear ungrounded,
incapable of objective demonstration." Id. Although one might believe that there is
a fundamental unity of human interests and that this unity provides the necessary
conditions for the emergence of shared truths, see R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 103,
242-44, 253, it is difficult to provide a satisfactory justification for this belief, and it is
certainly at odds with the Premise of Individualism.
Assuming, arguendo, that objective truth does exist, the marketplace theory may
still break down because it relies on classical economics' invisible hand to discover
truth. It is somewhat circular to rely on the economist's assumptions (albeit minimal)
about the rationality of individuals when it is rationality which is to be discovered or
acquired. People's experiences and interests may cause them not to perceive the cor-
rect truth. See Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 976. Moreover,
psychological studies indicate that the form and frequency of message presentation
may cause distortion, thereby preventing people from effectively using their rational
capacities to find the core of relevant information or argument. Id.; Emerson, Legal
Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. I, 8.
If human rational capacities may be misled, preservation of a marketplace that
will foster discovery of objective truth will require corrective devices to counteract
market imperfections. For instance, if major communications networks are held by a
relatively small group that basically expounds a single economic, political, and social
point of view, equalization of others' ability to participate in the marketplace would
be warranted. Emerson, supra, at 11-12. Most likely such equalization could be
achieved only by government intervention (either by restricting dominant groups or
subsidizing nondominant ones). Such a solution, however, is at fundamental odds
with a first amendment designed to limit governmental interference with speech.
Emerson, supra note 172, at 759. In the final analysis, therefore, the logic of a free
speech theory that rests on a marketplace of ideas for discovery of objective truth
compels a result that would be unacceptable under the first amendment.
217. Wolff argues that there is a fundamental paradox in the utilitarian claim that
the individual's acquisition of knowledge through the marketplace of ideas will foster
human happiness. According to Wolff, the question of whether knowledge contrib-
utes to happiness is an empirical one: "In order to decide whether we should permit
the growth of empirical knowledge, we must settle a question which is itself empirical,
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If truth is indeed subjective and thus particular to the individ-
ual, then how does the marketplace of ideas foster truth? The an-
swer would seem to be that a marketplace of ideas allows each
individual access to the amassed intellectual wealth embodied in
speech, thereby enabling her to choose her own truth from the
widest array of possible truths.2 18 Under this view, the market-
place of ideas is defended on the grounds that it fosters choice of
particular subjective truths.219 One can then ask whether this in-
terest in choice is best served by the unfettered competition of
ideas. Arguably, if the first amendment interest protected by the
marketplace is the freedom of choice among subjective truths, the
marketplace ought to be regulated to ensure that "unprofitable"
truths are aired.220 This suggestion is unworkable, however, be-
cause if truth is subjective and particular, the set of possible truths
is infinite. Given these circumstances, the government would
have no basis upon which to determine what truths to foster or
and hence a very part of that knowledge whose value we are attempting to estimate."
R. WOLFF, supra note 215, at 10. In the same sense, while the Premise of Individual-
ism requires the rejection of objective truth, it also must maintain as an objective
truth that there is no objective truth, or, at the very least, that it is not known.
218. If the government is allowed to restrict the marketplace of ideas, then indi-
viduals will be deprived of access to some truths that would otherwise be available, or
so the argument goes.
219. One could argue, in the alternative, that the marketplace of ideas promotes
the development of particular subjective truths. This argument assumes that the aban-
donment of one set of truths for another constitutes "development." This assumption
would involve a value judgment, as to the worth of an individual's discarded values
relative to the values adopted. We are lacking a secure standpoint, however, to sug-
gest that one's ends and values become "better" as one gets "older."
220. The freedom to choose particular subjective truths is enhanced as the set of
available truths is increased. Because the marketplace of ideas serves in large part to
discard unacceptable truths, the set of possible truths is restricted. On the other hand,
one could argue that the marketplace of ideas enhances freedom to choose particular
subjective truths because it weeds out falsity, thereby saving each generation from the
onerous task of sifting through the previous generation's mistakes.
As suggested earlier, liberal political philosophy adopts a historical "agnosti-
cism" that prevents serious questioning regarding whether decisions of previous gen-
erations restrict the choices of the present one. See supra text accompanying notes
57-58. On one hand, the Premise of Individualism requires that the decisions of past
generations to discard certain truths should not restrict the access of the present gen-
eration to those truths. On the other hand, the Premise of Individualism also requires
that the "false" truths of past generations should not obstruct the present generation's
search for truth. See supra text accompanying note 58. Thus, the Premise of Individ-
ualism informs both sides of the argument.
Redish claims that the marketplace of ideas theory may be grounded on the
value of self-realization because self-realization demands an unimpeded flow of infor-
mation to facilitate "life-affecting" decisions. See supra note 214. If this conclusion
follows from the idea that information enhances freedom to choose truth, then it
would appear to be an open question for liberal political philosophy whether an un-
fettered marketplace serves this function better than a market regulated by a govern-
ment which "subsidizes" some speech or enhances the quantity (and quality) of
information available in the marketplace.
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how to allocate resources to foster these truths.22t Therefore, even
if the market facilitates the choice of subjective truths, the set of
truths from which to choose will be limited to those for which
there already exists a demand. In short, there are serious
problems with attempts to defend the marketplace of ideas on the
grounds that it promotes either particular subjective truths or even
the choice of particular subjective truths.
Perhaps the goal of a marketplace theory might be to foster
one truth or, alternatively, a socially acceptable truth. If truth is
subjective, however, the concept of a marketplace of ideas in-
tended to promote truth becomes meaningless. There is no basis
for claiming that one truth is better than any other where there
exists a vacuum of objective truth. Consequently, the logic of
such a theory would allow government to suppress speech on the
grounds that at least one conception of truth would persist regard-
less of whatever speech was prohibited. But freedom of speech is
meaningless if it rests on a theory that allows for the authoritarian
imposition of truth.222
If the goal of the marketplace is to promote social consensus
concerning truth, then protection of speech hinges upon the extent
to which free speech is necessary to reach such a consensus. Pre-
sumably, all ideas that might be socially acceptable should be free
from government inhibition. One might also argue that the mar-
ketplace theory does not allow suppression of controversial or un-
popular ideas because, once suppressed, these ideas will simmer
underground, cause instability, and ultimately undermine consen-
sus. Some speech, however, might still be deemed lacking in any
value for promoting consensus and therefore be ineligible for
protection. 223
The root difficulty in grounding a first amendment theory on
the goal of reaching socially acceptable truth is to define a mediat-
ing principle to guide the determination of when speech should be
protected and when it should not. For example, it is not clear why
stability fostered through the free flow of controversial and un-
popular ideas promotes social consensus any more than does the
suppression of such ideas. If controversial and unpopular ideas
simmer underground and eventually emerge to destroy the ex-
isting consensus, presumably a new consensus will develop. Thus,
221. See Baker, First Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 985-90 (arguing that
attempts to repair market failures in the marketplace of ideas by granting equality of
access to viewpoints or to individuals must fail because the government is left with no
guidance as to how this might be accomplished).
222. Indeed, the idea of creating (i.e., artificially manufacturing) and imposing a
political truth is overtly fascistic.
223. See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 1, at 357; Schauer, supra note 118, at 616.
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if consensus is the concern, it can be achieved either through pro-
tection or suppression of controversial and unpopular ideas. The
choice between suppression and protection does not hinge on
whether consensus will result, but on whether one seeks to pro-
mote gradual or radical shifts in consensus. 224
Even accepting the argument that controversial and unpopu-
lar ideas should be protected in order to avoid radical shifts in
consensus, the scope of that argument's application is unclear.
For example, if we deny protection to blackmail or to advocacy of
murder because such protection is not necessary to reach consen-
sus concerning truth, then one might similarly argue that protect-
ing advocacy of civil disobedience or racism is not necessary
either. Thus, although the marketplace theory is attractive be-
cause it promotes important first amendment interests by estab-
lishing a presumption against governmental regulation of
speech,225 the theory lacks a concrete point of reference for defin-
ing the scope of protected speech.
Indeed, none of the versions of the marketplace of ideas the-
ory discussed herein appear to be capable of providing any crite-
rion to determine when an item of speech is sufficiently related to
the search for truth to warrant protection. One would somehow
have to define the substantive content of truth before being able to
determine whether particular speech warrants protection. Ironi-
cally, it is precisely because neither the truth nor its dimensions
are known that we are interested in a marketplace of ideas in the
first place. Therein lies the fundamental indeterminacy of the
marketplace of ideas theory: at what level of abstraction shall the
truth about the search for truth be defined? How can we decide
whether we want a flea market or a stock exchange unless we
know what is we want to buy?
224. If one would rather prevent radical shifts in consensus, then it seems, for
prudential reasons alone, that one would want to permit the airing of views that are
inconsistent with the democratic system. See supra note 199. Attempted suppression
of antidemocratic ideas is likely to result in radical (and less than peaceful) change if
these ideas should later come to be accepted on a wide scale.
One of the asserted and fairly well recognized purposes of the first amendment is
participation in peaceful change. See T. EMERSON, supra note 70, at 7; Baker, First
Amendment Freedom, supra note 1, at 990; BeVier, supra note 1, at 310. If peaceful
change is part of our constitutional system, then peaceful change would seem to re-
quire the possibility that our system be replaced entirely. To suggest that the premises
of the democratic system require the suppression of anti-democratic speech is to sug-
gest that there is a value more basic than peaceful change-namely, maintenance of
the democratic system. If this is the primary goal, it hardly indicates that suppression
of political ideas is the best manner in which to proceed.
225. The presumption against governmental regulation can, of course, give way
once the marketplace of ideas yields its corollary: market failures. See Baker, Free-
dom of Speech, supra note 1, at 981-85.
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V. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
DOING WITHOUT CATEGORICAL RULES
At the beginning of this Article, I argued that we do not know
the extent to which there is a community of needs, desires, and
dispositions among human beings. In response to this problem,
liberal political philosophers accord a broad scope of liberty to the
individual either for prudential reasons or because they view the
community of interests, desires, and dispositions as fairly limited.
This philosophy is codified in our Constitution. And, not surpris-
ingly, the norms of American behavior are few, and social practice
is highly varied. This is equally true of speech: the types of
speech we engage in, the value we place on speech, the manner in
which we speak, and the purposes for which we speak are highly
varied and not easily subject to categorization.
Liberal political philosophy and its professed lack of knowl-
edge of common characteristics 226 thus face three fundamental
issues:
1. How to define the scope and content of liberty and what
weights to ascribe to various liberties;
2. How to distinguish liberty from the means of its
realization;
3. What mediating principle to use in relating abstract liber-
ties to social practice.
Having explored the theories of Meiklejohn, Baker, Emerson, and
the Marketplace Theorists, it is apparent that categorical ap-
proaches can only reflect these three problems.
If we take the three major problems of liberal political philos-
ophy seriously, then any approach, not just categorical ap-
proaches, might appear to be precluded in a liberal democracy.
On the contrary, the success of theory depends in large part on the
tasks it sets for itself.227 In light of this realization, there are two
options for theory. First, theory can become strategic and try to
undermine the status quo. Such a course would be undertaken
not because the theory is true, but because adopting the theory
will disguise or undermine the bases of present contradictions.
Second, the claims of theory to truth can be lessened, and our ex-
pectations of theory can be restated and reformed.
The former approach, whether in the name of the reactionary
right or the radical left, is a form of intellectual domination which
is to be condemned-not because it is domination (that would re-
226. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
227. A theory that seeks to resolve the three major problems without a radical
transformation of the culture or an abandonment of the premises underlying the lib-
eral democratic state seems doomed to fail from the outset.
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quire an examination of the objects dominated), but because (al-
most surely) it will not work to alter the status quo in the ways
desired. The strategic suggestion that courts should adopt a par-
ticular categorical approach, and even further that the courts'
adoption of this categorical approach will result in the realization
of certain values, has several flaws: 1) it overestimates the power
of ideas, generally; 2) it overestimates the power of courts and of
the law to impose a rational order on the political and social struc-
ture to conform to the values advanced by the court; 3) it underes-
timates the ability of relatively privileged individuals, groups,
enterprises, institutions, and governmental actors to adjust their
activities to conform to the rules announced by the courts, while
negating the substantive values advanced; and 4) it underestimates
the possibility that the strategic character of the categorical ap-
proach will be discovered and its mystifying aim exposed.
Further, there is something rather sinister about leading the
courts and the citizenry into falsehood for the sake of eliminating
contradictions. Who will be the keeper of the truth that the false-
hood is false, and who will guarantee that the strategic falsehood
will not be perverted into a non-strategic falsehood? Of course,
categorical theories could be forthrightly presented as strategic.
But then courts would never accept them unless the theories con-
formed to the strategic concerns of the courts. And, because eve-
rybody would know what was going on, the strategic value of the
theories would be undermined: nobody would be fooled. Accord-
ingly, to adopt a categorical approach for purely strategic pur-
poses seems doomed from the outset, unless of course one's
strategic purposes are extremely modest.
On the other hand, these caveats need not reduce us to unbri-
dled cynicism about the power of ideas or terminal pessimism
about the power of the courts or of the law in ordering and influ-
encing the social and political order. The problem is one of find-
ing an appropriate language with which to communicate to courts.
The language we use and the language the courts use will largely
determine what can be discovered, accepted, or rejected.
This brings us to the second possible approach to developing
a first amendment theory: restating and reforming the tasks of
theory. The three major problems of liberal political philosophy
preclude categorical approaches as a method of analysis-both as
a matter of theoretical cogency and as a means of informing deci-
sion in concrete cases. If we take the three problems seriously,
and if we reject strategic defenses of categorical theories, then the
only tack to take (short of nihilism) is to redefine our expectations
of theory. In short, I suggest that an acceptable theory would
have to recognize and treat the three major problems in a rational
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manner reflecting the fragmented state of the culture. This re-
quires a theory recognizing: (1) that the definition of the scope
and content of protected liberties is problematic; (2) that the rela-
tion of liberty to the means of its realization is incapable of being
resolved in the abstract given the artificiality of an abstract separa-
tion of individual activities into a means and end component; and
(3) that the relation of real world facts to normative values is com-
plex and largely indeterminate.
Once these three problems are taken seriously, the goal of
theory is to outline a method that provides the tools with which to
respond to the three problems. No approach can guarantee good
or better outcomes in terms of substantive court decisions. Never-
theless, a theory that takes into account the three major problems
of liberal political philosophy will avoid the pitfalls that disregard
of these problems creates. The pitfalls of ignoring these problems
as manifested in categorical approaches can be capsulized as an
artificial restriction of meaning (descriptively and normatively), a
general mucking up of judicial language, and counterproductive
results.
In the service of preferred first amendment values, categorical
theories artificially restrict the realm of protected activities that
serve those values and, at the same time, expand the realm of pro-
tection to activities that have a dubious relation to those values.
The reason is simple: if one is to develop a categorical approach
to serve certain preferred first amendment values, then categories
can only be established by simplifying the manner in which facts
relate to value. I submit that each of the four parameters-con-
tent, source, manner, and effect-describes a particular way in
which facts can relate to value. A categorical approach cannot
take all four parameters into account in formulating categories
without developing a highly inelegant calculus of categories-a
calculus whose very inelegance would itself counsel against the
development of abstract categories.
Because categorical theories attempt to simplify the way in
which facts can relate to values, categorical theories often fail to
compel outcomes in concrete cases. The reason, again, is simple:
in any given case, what we perceive to be the significant relation
of facts to values may well depend upon a parameter (e.g. source,
content, etc.) which lies outside the categorical framework ad-
vanced. Sooner or later, the categorical framework loses the
meaning which it initially might have had as concerns extrinsic to
the framework are smuggled into its abstract terminology.
Still, categorical approaches pretend to compel outcomes in
concrete cases. This feature of categorical approaches also robs
first amendment theory of meaning. The danger of categorical
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approaches is that to some extent they present the courts with
prepackaged justifications for particular outcomes. By advancing
categories which purportedly compel conclusions, the courts are
relieved of the responsibility of judgment: the only failure of a
court under a categorical approach is a misclassification, a clerical
error akin to a postman misplacing a letter. To be sure, the act of
classifying is in a sense an exercise of judgment. But, in another
sense, it is not. If categorical theories pretend to compel decisions
in concrete cases, but in fact do not, then the court's exercise in
classification becomes simply a cover for attaching certain conse-
quences (protection or non-protection) to certain activities on the
basis of concerns never articulated and, therefore, never judged.
Indeed, to the extent that courts feel bound by a given cate-
gorical approach, they must develop and articulate facts that will
allow the categorical approach to compel a decision. The danger
is that in any given case the facts may not allow the categorical
approach to compel a conclusion one way or the other. When this
happens, a premium is placed on the court's characterization of
the facts. Thus, in some cases categorical approaches will cause
courts to distort the facts so that the categorical approach may
yield an outcome (i.e., protection or non-protection).
In effect, by placing such a premium on the characterization
of facts in tough cases, categorical approaches destroy the mean-
ing inherent in the common law method of adjudication and arti-
ficially restrict the judicial language. Categorical approaches
short-circuit the language of common law adjudication becaus
the facts underlying court decisions become superfluous. What i:,
relevant is how the facts are characterized in precedent. And that,
in turn, depends on the categorical approach under which the pre-
cedent was established. In short, under a categorical approach,
precedent is robbed of its value, and comparison of the present
case to precedent cannot be expected to yield any insights or value
distinctions that are not already included in the ruling categorical
approach. Not only are courts thereby deprived of the meaning
and insight that common law adjudication might yield, but also
their decisions risk becoming increasingly divorced from the way
in which people view facts, values, and the relation between the
two. This is not to say that courts should necessarily view facts,
values, and their relation in accordance with a common consen-
sus. Rather, if a court chooses to speak in a foreign language, this
choice should not be simply the incidental result of an artificial
restriction of judicial language.
Closely associated with the point that categorical approaches
place an undue premium on the characterization of facts so as to
validate the ruling categorical approach is the argument that cate-
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gorical approaches prevent courts from articulating and develop-
ing facts which might be relevant to the preferred substantive
values observed by courts. Because categorical approaches often
serve to enshrine one substantive value to the exclusion of other
equally unimpeachable (or impeachable) values, and because cat-
egorical theories grossly simplify the way in which facts can relate
to values, categorical approaches deprive courts of factual infor-
mation ab initio. By restricting the places where the courts might
look to justify their decisions in terms of values, facts, and their
relation, decisional law becomes increasingly divorced from the
objects it is intended to regulate and thus from the values that it
ostensibly observes. The disregard for particularity inherent in
the categorical approach is thus likely to result both in decisions
protecting first amendment rights where the values ostensibly sup-
porting the first amendment are not implicated and in decisions
denying first amendment rights where no legitimate community
interests are implicated.
What is more, categorical approaches hypostatize the culture.
They do not take seriously the fact that culture is evolving, that
substantive first amendment values become more or less impor-
tant depending upon the content of the culture, that the ways in
which these values are implicated in social practice or individual
activities are subject to change. In short, categorical approaches
hold out the false promises that the judiciary has arrived at a state
of knowledge, that the culture can be rationally ordered, and that
all that remains is for the courts to classify the parts of the culture
into the taxonomy. The problem with this approach, apart from
its falsehood, is that it is self-validating and, to a large extent,
serves to insulate the courts from the real, if not the true, facts.
The final vice of categorical approaches is that they underes-
timate their own power on the culture. Categorical theories are
offered to translate some preferred first amendment values into
reality. All categorical theories, however, fail to assess the effect
their adoption would have on the process of translation. Given
that courts have some influence on the culture, as soon as a cate-
gorical approach is adopted, we would expect to see powerful in-
dividuals, enterprises, institutions, and governmental actors
restructure their conduct in response to the categorical framework
in order that the same ends pursued before might be realized still.
A categorical theory is thus always out of date. The only way to
relate values to reality is to take into account the changes brought
about in this relation by the very fact that the courts decide cases.
The high degree of abstraction and the rigidity of categorical ap-
proaches in effect prevent categorical theories from taking into ac-
count this "feedback" effect of court decisions on values, facts,
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and their relation. This "feedback" problem affects all theory; the
measure of theory is not whether it avoids the "feedback" prob-
lem, but whether it provides a mechanism to deal with the feed-
back problems. The very ambition of categorical approaches to
compel outcomes by means of an abstract and rigid first amend-
ment analysis precludes a serious consideration of the "feedback"
problem within their frameworks. Therefore it would be no sur-
prise if categorical approaches systematically failed to advance the
values they hold dear.
In sum, if we are to take the three problems of liberal polit-
ical philosophy seriously, we must reject categorical approaches.
The measure of a satisfactory theory must be restated and re-
formed in terms of these three problems. One thing we can ask of
courts is to make clear their stance in relation to these problems.
In essence, my claim is that categorical approaches unneces-
sarily muck up the way in which courts speak and think about first
amendment analysis and that, therefore, such approaches speak
neither to the values which they ostensibly seek to advance nor to
the culture which they seek to regulate. Absent strategic concerns
to the contrary, we have an interest in having the courts use a
clear and meaningful language by which to engage us in a dia-
logue on the meaning and content of the first amendment. The
language of categorical approaches artificially restricts these pos-
sibilities. We are deprived of the grounds for meaningful or rich
explanations of why any given substantive decision of a court
might well be right or wrong.
How then might the language of first amendment analysis be
cleaned up? We may begin by taking seriously the problems of
liberal political philosophy. The negative theses of this Article
provide some basis for avoiding a language that obscures crucial
issues. Beyond that, I have suggested that four parameters---con-
tent, source, manner, and effect-are all potentially relevant to
first amendment analysis. The support for this claim is more sug-
gestive than compulsory. In part, it rests on the attraction which
the theories of Meiklejohn, Emerson, Baker, and the Marketplace
Theorists discussed herein have for us. Stripped of their rigidity
and classification schemes, the four theories together encompass
the four parameters. I have also suggested that in some distinct
areas of first amendment jurisprudence, a different parameter ad-
dresses some of the basic concerns over whether the speech activ-
ity ought to be protected and what level of protection it should be
afforded. 228 To be sure, some would argue that one of the four
parameters (e.g., source) is always and should always be irrelevant
228. See supra text accompanying notes 104-115.
[Vol. 30:671
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
to first amendment analysis. But I suggest that such an issue
should be decided not in the abstract, but in the context of partic-
ular factual issues that present the question most saliently. For
example, if one wants to argue that source is always irrelevant to
first amendment analysis, the argument should be made in the
context of corporate or government speech.
The appeal of the four parameters approach lies in the fact
that each describes a way in which facts can relate to value. The
parameters point to varying'types of inquiries that courts might
make in attempting to show and justify a relation between facts
and value. It may be that in one area of first amendment jurispru-
dence only one of the parameters seems to pose the crucial rela-
tion. In other areas of first amendment jurisprudence, all four
parameters may provide the basis for arguments that the activity
ought or ought not to be protected. The four parameters simply
point to routes of inquiry. That any of these routes in a given area
of first amendment jurisprudence will lead nowhere seems
likely-but at least that will be knowledge gained. The four pa-
rameters approach is to be defended not on the grounds that it will
produce better decisions (it may not), but rather on the grounds
that it will permit decisions that are based upon a realistic ap-
praisal of the fragmented state of the culture. The approach will
permit decisions based on facts as opposed to the twisting of phe-
nomena to fit preordained categories. The approach will require a
court to articulate its value preferences. In short, the four parame-
ters approach will permit, though not compel, a more rational di-
vision of the powers of the community and the rights of the
individual.
The division may be more rational in that it may be more
narrowly tailored to the facts: no unnecessary waste of liberty on
the side of the individual and no unnecessary waste of power on
the side of the community need occur. By contrast, categorical
theories waste liberty by protecting rights of individuals where
these rights are neither highly valued nor much impaired. Simi-
larly, categorical theories waste community powers by allowing
oppressive legislation not essential to the community's needs. By
reflecting a more realistic appraisal of the culture, a focus on the
four parameters can serve to avoid the creation of these
wastelands.
The four parameters approach announces itself as a heuristic
device, not a means to compel outcomes. The very indeterminacy
of an approach that claims to be heuristic may seem horrific to
some commentators: they would argue that no constraints on ju-
dicial decisionmaking are imposed by this approach. On the con-
trary, because the four parameters approach refuses to provide
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ready-made apologies, argument and justification are placed
where they belong: the articulation and defense of the substantive
values the courts attribute to the first amendment, the facts of the
cases brought or to be brought before the courts, and the relation
between facts and values. The four parameters approach places a
premium on the development and articulation of facts by the
courts inasmuch as the justification for a court's decision must
turn upon a statement of how facts relate to values. 229
What is to be gained from all this? Better decisions? If we
take the three problems of liberal political philosophy seriously,
then the issue of what constitutes a good outcome or a bad out-
come is inherently problematic. This is not to say that we cannot
criticize a court for the substantive outcomes its decisions produce
or the values it advances. On the other hand, it does seem to pre-
clude us from prescribing a mode of first amendment analysis that
will systematically produce good outcomes. We can hope that the
four parameters approach will produce a mode of first amend-
ment analysis that is richer than categorical approaches, one that
allows courts to speak a language that is more reflective of the
culture, a language that allows the court to gain and disseminate
more information about the facts and how these might be related
to values.
By injecting greater clarity in the language of the courts, deci-
sions that are unnecessary to the values sought to be realized
might be avoided to a greater extent. Furthermore, we have an
interest in having courts make clear what they contribute (or do
not contribute) to the culture.
We can hope that the four parameters approach will allow
courts to engage in a meaningful dialogue with those who come
before them and those who are subjected to the courts' decisions.
We can hope, but there is no guarantee. The hope rests largely on
the premise that courts are constrained by a need to justify their
decisions.
My premise may be false: intellectual self-justification may
not be a constraint on judicial decisions. But surely categorical
approaches serve as no constraint either. It may be that the cul-
ture is so fragmented and the problems of liberal political philoso-
phy so intractable that the four parameters approach must fail to
provide any meaningful method to analyze first amendment is-
sues. If the four parameters approach is unworkable for these rea-
sons, however, then any mode of analysis one might offer to the
229. Abandonment of categorical approaches in favor of the four parameters ap-
proach will also require a return to the traditional tools of judicial decisionmaking:
comparison of the present case to precedent.
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courts will prove unsatisfactory as a formally rational exercise in
moral and political randomness.
CONCLUSION
It all comes down to this: courts should adopt a language
that permits a first amendment analysis of concrete cases and pro-
duces decisions that are falsifiable in meaningful ways. If the neg-
ative theses developed in this Article are persuasive, categorical
approaches are no longer falsifiable in meaningful ways for they
have been falsified ab initio. Part of their falsehood arises because
they artificially restrict normative and empirical statements, as
well as statements of the relation between values and facts that the
courts might make. The four parameters approach is a sketchy
suggestion of how the courts might develop a meaningful method
of first amendment analysis. Whether it is simply no more than
thread for the new clothes of a naked emperor is another question.
